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PRF:PACE 
The conclusion of this thesis is that there is a promis-
ing future for ~~erican capital i nvestment in the Japanese 
economy. Although the past policies of tho Japanese government 
have boen intended to discourage foreign investment and foreign 
management participation, recent events have pointed to a gradual 
easing of these restrictive attitudes. Coupled •ith tbis 
relaxation of foreign investment regulations is the increasingly 
liberal attitude of the Japanese business community. This 
~eater awareness ot modern business requirements has been 
stimulated by the nation's expanding economy, and by the demands 
ot other nations. Por t he year 1961, total annual capital 
inflow, mainly 1n tho form ot stock purchases and loans, oxceeded 
$$00 million. In addition, the number of technical agreements 
concluded (now at 1 , 739 ) in that year was doubl e that of 19$8. 
or these, 6$% were with Americans . In view of the projected 
growth of t he economy, all evidence points to an increased 
neod for foreign capital . However , the type of investment 
allowed will still be controlled rather closely by the Japanese 
government . 
The thesis is divided into four parts: the first is a 
general introduction to the economy and t he growth industries; 
the second treats t he climate and the various structural aspects ; 
the third covers the existing pattern of foreign investments 
in Japan, with emphasis on the pr eferred industries; and the 
viii 
tourtb discusses the prospects tor tho future . By starting 
~1tb a treatment of the economic development of the nation, 
it is my intention to demonstrate the favorability of the 
market to external capital. 
Attar discussing the various legal and tax obstacles 
which reduce the profitableness, the present status of k~erican 
f i rms in tho Japanese economy will be brought into focus . 
Attitudes of both the Japanese executive and the financier wi ll 
be considered. Selected case studies will be utilized to depict 
the prospects ahead for future investors . The last section 
will then make use of the foregoing to draw conclusions as to 
the prospects for American participation in Japanese industry. 
Heavy reliance will be placed on the conclusions or oeonomic 
study groups , such as government- sponsored trade missions and 
the Committee for Bconomio Development. 
In summary, it is emphaoized that the rapidly expanding 
economy of Japan requires additional capital investment badly; 
and the most promising source is tram abroad . The government , 
sensing thi s , i s gradually relaxing the numerous restrictions, 
although 1t lOUst be admitted that the varied controls which 
the government exercises over business will never be entirely 
relinquished. This is one reason for tho removal of the 
ancillary restrictions . 
The optimism of the United States business community may 
by symbolized by the successfUl creation in 1959 by the Upjohn 
Company and Ampex Corporation, respectively , or a SS~owned 
Japanese oubs1diary and a wholly- owned Japanese aubsidiary , 
both without any government approval for profit or capital 
repatriation. Such "pure yen" investments will certainly 
assume greater value as the time for full convertibility of 
the Japanese currency draws near . 
Since late 1962, the Japanese have made significant 
efforts to attract more foreign capital into their economy. 
Heavy emphasis has been placod on the securing of funds 
through the sale of securities over the counter . Concurrently , 
the government has promised to allow ea•ier pa•sage for the 
approval of joint ventures involving foreign companies . These 
moves , together with the recent rrooing of imports from fore i gn 
exchange controla , are seen as tororunnors for the oventual 
full convertibility of the Japanese currency (expected 1n late 
1964). Considering the significant developments which have 
occurred in foreign investment in Japan during the l ast year, 
one must admit that this thesis deal• with a very timely and 
most ~ortsnt subject . 
A word of thanks is owed those who lent " helping hand 
in the preparation or this project . I am indebted to Or. 
David J . Ashton ot Bo•ton University whose patient counsel and 
critical comment• made this ·~rk possible. In the ••curing 
or valuable re•ea.reh Material, Mr. J . Mark ~!obius of the 
Political Science Section at tho Massachusett3 Institute ot 
Technology was extremely holptul . Finally, the cooperation 
ot tho•e who so kindly complied with requests for pertinent 
material is sincerely appreciated. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTIO!I TO TlfE JAPA!IJ':SE ECONO>!Y 
Chapter 1 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1 . 1 Postwar Developments 
Aa a result of World ~tar II , the i ndustrial complex of 
Japan waa reduced t o -30% of prewar capacity; and the entire 
economy waa down to less than 60% of its former level . 'rh1s 
was , i ndeed, a quite different situation than that which 
existed following the pr evious World './ar . Following an 
expansive program of sooiel and eeonanic change, initiated at 
the end of the 19th century, the nation had enjoyed an im-
pressive industrial growth duri ng the l920 1s and 1930 ' s . 
However, the combination of military operations, lack of 
mai.ntenance , and isolation from int ernational trade wrought 
havoc and brought the national economy to a virtual standstill . l 
Despite such setbacks, Japan , witb the nosistance of the 
United States and de~onds resulting from tho Koroan conflict , 
was able to achieve an average annual increase in Gross National 
Produce (GNP) of 12% from 1946 to 1952 and has continued to 
grow a t a rate of 9% since 19$3. By 1956, production had 
l. WTIS 1 "Industrial Develop:Dents in Japan , " ECONOMIC REPORTS , llo . o0- 41 (Aug. 1960) 1. 
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surpassed the wartime peak of 19h4; and in 1959 per capita 
inco~o was up to $255. By 1959, total production had more than 
doubled , industrial output increased 275% since 1946, and 
agriculture was shattering records . Japan is now the world's 
leading shipbui lder , and is sixth in steel production; 
technology has given her an enviabl e position i n both optical 
and transistor manutacture . 2 
A variety of factors are responsibls for this amazing 
growth, including the following: an extraordinary high rate 
of capital investment (about 30% ot GNP per year), co=bined 
with effective utilization of managerial and labor skills ; 
receipts from United States military expenditures end off - shore 
procurements of AID (Agency for International Development) ; 
a substantial rise in exports; a rising l evel of domestic 
consumption , refl ecting increased real wages; adoption ot a 
wide variety of modern industrial technology; and generally 
sound fiscal and monetary pol1c1es. 3 Fortunately, this growth 
has been accompanied by a relatively stable wholesale and 
consumer price and a low birth rate . Credit for this stability 
can be awarded to the highest rate of savings in the world and 
the rising productivity in agriculture and industry. 
Nonetheless, this period of a "superheated economy" has 
been beset with problems for the government . The domestic 
2 . Businees International, U.S. BUS INESS IN JAPAN, PROBL~~S 
AND OPPORTUNITIES (New York, 19$9) , $ . 
) . WTIS , op . cit., 1 . 
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~arkot hAs been conrrontod vitb increasing nuabora or durable 
and a..tdurable consuaer goods, such ao television sots , auto-
aobiloe, toiletries, and conned foods . At tho aamo tL~e, sbort-
agoa of skilled labor and fUll capacity production have strained 
tho country ' s resources . Tho resulting rise in labor costs 
and imports forced the govo~nt to take roatrictive measures 
in 19S3, 19S7, and again in 1961 to curtail tho economic 
growth. 
Because of tho economy's ex"reme dependence on foreign 
trade and tho difficulty of expandi ng expcrte , a boom period 
ie almost always followed by a foreign exchange cr1a1e . At 
this point , the government intervenes with credit restricti ons 
at the Bank of Japan and production controls. To date , these 
monetary end a~inistrativo aethods have boon euccoaetul in 
curbing inflation. Under tho scrutiny of govornaont officials, 
the reatrlct1ons are eaaed When economic data indicate tbo 
proper production levela and sufficient foreign exchange . 
Tho success of this operation can be att ributed to the close 
controls which the government exorcises over tho foreign currency 
reaervea , the d~estio money aarket , and corporate management . 
In a sense , Japan actually h~• a directed economy.4 
In addition to fluctuations in tho econoay, another 
roault or tbe nation's dopondonco on foreign trade is the 
gradual evolution of tho industrial structure toward heavy 
Pu "1 Bank Bulletin , "Sociel Patterns and .:!conomic Poli cies , " 3-7 . 
-~-
industry, •hich stresses the production and export ot the basic 
captial intensive industries , such as iron and steel, petro-
chemicals , and heavy machinery . One can see in this shift 
an attempt to reduce the reliance on imports of ra~ materials 
(in the case ot l i ght i ndustries such as textiles), and to 
increase tho value added by production (heavy and chemical 
industries) , $ In 19$9, the heavy and cheMical industries 
contributed 62% of the total added value production of the 
manutaoturing industries-up 12% from 19$$. Even further con-
centration is envisaged by the government's 10-year income 
doubling plan; and the gsjority ot the private investment 
projects are directed toward such industries as the automobilo , 
electric machinery, &lectronies, and petrochemical . 
1 . 2 Physical Environment 
One ever present fact must be borne i n mind by the planners 
of Japan's future ; and that is the geographical limits of the 
country's resources . Japan barely cooprises 147,000 square 
miles of land surface , less than one-twentieth the area of 
the United States, Even •orse, more than 75% of this area is 
too mountainous for cultivation. The resulting over- cultiva-
tion or the remaining land area baa given priority status to 
the production of chemical fertilizer . Moreover, a change in 
the dietary habits bas taken more land from rice production, 
and transferred it to wheat and grazing land. Fortunately, 
5 . The Foreign Capital Research Society, JAPANESE INDUSTRY 
1961 (Tokyo, 1961) , 11-12 
-5-
mechanization and improv~d techniques, such as double cropping, 
have increased production. Yet, auch labor-saving devices 
create agricultural unemployment and increase urban migration 
into already overcrowded areas . In addition, Japan still must 
import about 20% or her food requirements . 
or the raw materials most essential to industry, such as 
rubber, zinc , and phosphates , Japan must import about 80- 90%. 
'llool and cotton, which support the huge textile complex, are 
totally foreign . Iron ore import s are expected to top 17 
million tons in 1965, according to informed sourcea. 6 As 
Japan ' s coal reooureea are of poor quality, she must seek sUit-
able ooking coal fro~ abroad. 
In tho energy sector ot the economy, hydroelectric powe r 
is an extremely important factor , but its potential is limited 
by the small number of sitos available for developm&nt . 
Furthermore , Japan is switching from coal to oil for domestic 
power, even though 95~ ot i ts petroleum must be imported. 
Coal produc t ion for 1961 increased to 53 million tons , a cere 
4~ over 1960. Power eompan1es , national railways , iron and 
steel producers, and gas companies continue to be the major 
consumers but are currently converting to fuel o11 for their 
major energy source. Demand for heavy oil in 1961 totaled 
20 million kiloliters , an increase or 18~ over 1960. To 
satisfy this demand , imports or crude oil in 1961 amounted to 
6. Business International , op. cit., 8 . 
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38 aillion kiloliters , and by 1970 are expected to reach 89 
alllion kiloliters . Presently, the question of ownership of 
oil refineries bas beoome a major problem, with the gove~ent 
aeeking to oust much of the foreign control . ? UltiMately, 
the final answer will lie in atomi c anergy; and currently 
conatruction of a power plant is scheduled for cowpletion 1n 
196h. 
Transportation i s one or the core serlcua internal obs-
tacaa to indus trial growth. Over leaded railroads are being 
revamped to provide by 1967 an increase in passenger and freight 
haul age of 39% and J4% roopootivoly. Total coat of this pro-
grac is estimat ed at tl .66 billion. The notoriously inadoquate 
highway ayst~ is alao scheduled for tcprovements , but progress 
will be slow. Air trans >Ort ia adequate at present, but only 
large citiea are being etrYiced, Shipping, which ia vitally 
important to trade , ranks fifth a:ong maritlfte nations in 
tonnage . It carried in 1960 44.2% of Japan ' s exports and 
46 . J~ of her import s . 
Presently , Japan is attempting to broaden her sources of 
mineral imports and, as a result , i s 1n direct competition 
with •••tern EUrope. Areas or interest include Latin A=erica , 
Africa , and the !lear East . Most rece.:>tly , the Soviet Union 
has been supplying oigniticant a=ounts of crude oil to Japan .8 
1. l eo Section 9. 1 
8 . 11: . 1' . lo'ang, Y.INZ~LS IH JAPAN'S DIDUSTRIAL ECO:IOI!Y (U . S. 
Dept . or the Inter ior , 1962) , 22- 26 
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1. 3 The Gov$rnment 
Basically, the form of government is deMocrati c , with 
provisions for a Diet and a Supreme Court . A new constitution, 
enacted in 1947, recognized the sover$1gnty of th$ people , 
and accordingly the majority of the population exercises its 
right to vote . Yet , in spi t e of al l outward democratic ten-
denci es , the men who govern nre members o£ a relative l y small 
elite or top businessmen, top ottici als, and some elected 
poli ticians . In general , most possess siMilar oducational 
backgrounds and social 1doals .9 
At present , the moderates (Liberal Democ rats) , who are 
amenable to participation i n worl d affairs , sro 1n power and 
show every l ikelihood of remaining there . Opposing t hem wi th 
a minority in the Diet is the Japan Socialist Party. Neither 
of these , however, is a political party in the A~r1can sense . 
Instead , they are groupings of factions and are d~inated by 
personalities, r ather than by party platforms . The situation 
is further complicated by the constant maneuvering for power 
by the party factions. Alt hough tho present party is expected 
to remain in power , t ho pol i tical acene will undoubtedly see 
a succession of factions in control . The current Prime 1-tiniater 
is baaing his tenure on the success or the e conomic development 
progr am (sao section 3. 1) . 
The chances for political stability are very good . The 
farm population , having benefited from the post~ar land reforms , 
9 . Lawrence Olson, "A Note on Japan," AU'FS REPORTS SERV!CE, 
Vol . X No. 2 (New York , April 1962) , 9-10 
is the most stable Yote and , it the eco~~ cont1nuta to prosper , 
the urban middle class will also faYor the L1b•ral Domocrats . 
In general, tho majority of the factory work~rs are influenced 
by their superiors Who wish to maintain the status quo , although 
tho Socialists derive a good portion of their voting strength 
fro= organized labor (JS~ of the industrial force) . With the 
support of many intellectuals and a lArge urban vote , the 
Socialists usually vin a third of the seats in the viet . EoweYer, 
eight million votes separate the tvo parties; ann the Socialists 
are weakened further by constant splits within tho fac t ions . 
Thue , the conservatives will very probably oeo a chango of 
p~rty l•aders as new faooo emerge ; but , t h• party aa a ~ole 
appears to be the ~oat pramiaing to both tho Japonooo and the 
West . 
It has been asserted that Ja~an ha3 , 1n aetual1tr, n 
planned economy. Tho peculiar sociological charaeteriotica 
of tho Japanese peoplo which emphasize loyalty and paternalisM, 
nnd the basic industrial ownership structure onable a bureau-
cratic government to pervade every activity or businoas . Fro~ 
the beginning of its industrial surge in tho 19th oontury, 
the Japan•ae gove~ont boa alvaya reserved the right to approve 
or disapprove nov plent inveabaent end to eatabliah controls 
over foreign trade . Tbe general objective hea boen to atrengtben 
Japanese competi t ion in world narkota by avoiding internal 
competition due to exoeas capacity or wasteful expenditure. 
1. 4 Ponulat1on ~ Social Character 
'' or 1961, the population figure stood at 94.1 million, 
- 10-
the fifth l argeot in the world. Tho 1959 birth r ate was 17. 5 
per thousand whereas that of the United States was 24.1. In 
spite or the ~idely heralded birth control, the annual rate of 
natural population increase is 1~, l a r gely due to improved 
nedical f acilities . By 1990, the population is expected to 
reach 107 million. 
Considering t he likelihood of further rationalization 
and concentration of i ndustry, t he resulting urban mi gration 
from the f arms will press heavily on tho highly concentrated 
Kanto Plai ns and Osaka- Kobe r egion. lO With improvements i n 
transportation, t here is a good possibi l ity that industry will 
disperse ~ore widely. Yet, to accomplish this task , the mo-
bility of the labor f orce will have to be increased . The 
peculiar system of ~ployment in Japan today has the effect 
of virtually P1nd1ng tbo wQrkor t9 the ftctor7 for lif e,ll 
The individual Japanese finds himself enmeshod from 
childhood 1n a web of relationships and obligations which do 
not encourage freedom or ac tion. The industrial entrepreneurs 
or the Japanese economy utilized these peculiar characteristics 
to build an indust rial complex whi ch is unique . ~nroo aspects 
or t he relevant human relations can be outlined: ( l } the 
full dedication or the individual to his fsmily and other 
associations; (2} reliance on group unanimity for guidance ; 
and (3} the noncompetitive nature of relationships between 
10. Soo map on page 6 . 
11. James G. Abegglen, THE JAPM~E FACfORY. . • (Illinois, 
1958) , l l - 15 
- 11-
i ndividuals . An oxeeption to this noncompetitive norm 1s 
found in the educational sector of t he society. Although 
adults are not encouraged to be aggressive in their relations 
with each other , the Japanese youth must exert himself in order 
to pass tho difficult college entrence exams . Each year , 
thousands of high school students compete with each other for 
the honor ot being admitted to an institution or higher learning. 
The Japanese place a high val uo on education but , unfortunately, 
only a limited na~ber of students can be accepted. 
Clear ly , however, modifications of the social struc t ure 
are an imminent probability. Tho conservative temperament of 
the average Japanese wi l l preclude any radical change. None-
theless , the rising standard or living and the increased 
awareness of the people of foreign customs will force the 
governnent and the business community to cater to a modicum 
of modern i ndivi dualism. Bearing in mind the success of past 
generations !or abaorbing aspects of foreign cultures, there 
i s every l ikelihood that the Japanese c i tizen will enjoy tho 
fruit s of more f reedom ot action . 
1.$ Internati onal Econoni c Rel ati ons 
essentially , Japan must trade to survivo . ?or n nation 
which imports 75~ of her i ndustria l r aw materials and 20% 
of its food , it is vitally impor tant to expand exioting markets . 
Presently, Japan is a full- fledged m~ber of the Western 
community, ruod is a party to the GA?r agreements . Unfortunately , 
several European moGbers still decline to grant Japan trade 
concessions enjoyed by other members . Only just recently did 
England grant Japan full privileges. 
- 12-
In the interest of maintaining good relations , Japan 
voluntarily limits her exports of some produc ts to tho United 
Stntoo . However , she still persists in restricting imports 
excessively by high tariffs and exchange controls. Already, 
Japan baa entered the Latin A:norican and African markets ; and 
now tho possibility of nn expanding Asian market has occurred. 
The United States i s gradually including Japan in the burden 
of economic devolop~ent in Southeast Asia. ln addition to 
war reparations (t<hich were never sufficient to repair t he war 
damage to these nations) , Japan is now investing in such 
countries ns India, the Phillippines and Australia . With the 
shift in Japan's industrial structure, she must prepare thoso 
markets for increasing ~ounts or capital exports, so as to 
pay for the l arge im?orts from this region. 
ln the lons run 1 Japan will strengthen her ties with the 
Western community, both from political and economic incontivea. 
Nonetheless , it should be expected that she will enlarge her 
trade wi t h hor neighbour, tho Soviet Union . The prospeots 
for Red China aro dim , as that economy is t oo dependent on 
tho Soviet Union , 
-13-
Chapter 2 
INDUSTRIAL APPRAISAL 
2,1 Ma jor Industries 
Japan baa frequently been called the workshop of Ash 
because of its large and diverse i ndustrial complex . It is on 
this industrial plant which Japan must rely to provide employ-
ment for its growing l abor force . 
Tbe iron and steel industry is the largest of all the 
manufacturing froups , This haa been the result of a program 
of expansion and modernization and the introduction of new 
and improved techniques . A good part of this renovation bas 
been accomplished through forei gn loans and technological 
aosistance agr eements with the United States nnd other countries . 
Despite its dependence on overseas sources for practically all 
major basie materials , as iron ore, iron and steel scrap, and 
coking coal, Japan ranked fourth in the world's production 
of crude steel as of 19&1. Total tonnage 1n that year was 
approximately 28 . 3 million tons of crude steel or an increase 
of 28% over l9oo , l2 Increases wer e also achieved in the output 
of pig iron at 15. 8 million tons , up 33% over 1960; hot rolled 
steel 19.& million tons , up 22%; and hot rol led special steel 
1 . 5 million tons , up 2&%. Heavy consumers of steel, such ao 
rolling stock, shipbuilding, autORobile , machinery, and con-
struction, were responsible far this "baby boom. 11 
12. WTIS, "Economic Developments in Japan 1961" ECONOMIC 
REPORTS , Part 1, No , 62- 28 , 5, 
Inveatments 1n tho industrr during 1961 totaled about 
$790 million 1n plant and equi~•nt, an increase or 23~ over 
the preceding year . 3Xpectationa are that invest&enta will 
continue to bo heAvy during the 1961- 60 poriod in order to 
moot the oxtimsted demand of S3 million tona . By 1970, total 
inveslzonta ><ill roach $8. 3 billlon. During 1961, however , 
total exports were 2 . 2 million tons , a reflection of tho tact 
that most or tha stool production is for domoatic users who , 
1n turn , vill manufacture lllany export ;>roduota . 
One sig!llfieant indicator or Japan •• r•tbor vigorous 
economic expansion has been the increasing importance or tha 
heavy machinery sector. For oxam~le , the production or elaetrieal 
maebinerr bas increaaod five-told since l9S6, and -reaently 
aeeounta tor one-halt or all maehinerr output . Leading manu-
facturers are still working ott hUgo baoklosa of untilled orders 
trc:m tho electric now.,r, steel, transportation, a.....n :1achinery 
industries . Now ordora tor tho first 9 months ot 1961 totaled 
$673 m1llion~3 Also , the machine-tool industry incroaaod 
production nearly five tines in number and twelve times by 
value since 1955. Dee~ite thia rapid expanlion, the backlog 
ot untilled ordera increased to $14S million by September 
1961. Likewise , DftW orders , including subeontrscts, totaled 
nearly el. 2 billion tor the tirat 9 months or 1Q6l, and the 
denand tor aueb items as conetruetion machinery, distillation 
13. Ibid., 6. 
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and liquefaction equipment , ~bber and synthetic rosin apparatus , 
etc. , continues eo outstrip suppl:y . 
During tbia ti=e , Japen has endeavored to bring the qualit:y 
or her maobinor:y up to Western standards b:y tho import or now 
teobniquea , chiefly from tho United States. In aomo fields , 
however, Japan is recogni:ed to be on a par with or above the 
Weat , notably 1n typos of electronic and ca==un.ication oqui~nt . 
Tbe autacotive 1nduatr:v ia enjoying a at.eady increase, 
largely due to ito protection frQQ foreign ccmoet!tion. Total 
oaaaenger end truck production reached 180, 300 unite and 
300,000 units, respectively for tho year ending September 
l9bl. Ironicall:r enough, excessive gains are not considered 
deairable b:y so~o , as the roada in Jap~~ are not oapoblo of 
handling even present troffio. S1gn1t!cently, this is a 
~jor area of consideration in tho govornzent 1 s devolo; ont 
plan. 
l'.acbiner:y exporto havo eonolsted l'lOStly Of Ships '!lld 
light machinery, such as sowing machines , textile ~ach1nery, 
and optical inst~~ents . Recently, however , thoro is a drive 
to pr0111oto tho export of heavy macbiner:y and plant equiiX'Ient , 
an abaolute necessity When the shift of tho induotrial structure is 
considered. 
The chemical industry ha& also seen marked gains , particu-
larlJ in the production or ethylene, vinyl acetate , oynthetic 
rubber , and pure benzene . Tho petrochemical induatry is 
preaently purchasing tecbnologJ from the Vn1ted States , Italy, 
and oeat Oer.oany to in'l•nent rurtbor capacity expansion and 
product• on or goods now 1Dported. Japan r•nks third 1n tho 
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world's production of nitrogenous fertilizer, but is also one 
ot the largest cons~~rs or fertilizer, Preliminary data 
indicate that the production of chemicals , drugs , and phar-
maceuticals in 1961 was far above 1960. Vitamins , antibiotics , 
and sultiso:Didine are the most important drug and pharmaceut ical 
products , while ammonia, soda ash, eauatie soda , salt , and 
various acida are the important ohem1cal manufactures . Imports 
of chemicals for January - September 1961 totaled $244 million, 
while exports for this period were $140 million. 
Since 1955, Japan has been the world 1s l arges t shipbuilder, 
with 1. 8 million tons launched in 1961. For the 11 months of 
1961, the sale or ships totaled $249 million and was exceeded 
only by exports of iron and steel and cotton f abrics . 
Petroleum leads the "enorg7 revolution" which is charac-
terized by the greater use of liquid fuels , to the detriment 
of coal . 14 Demand for petroleum products in 1961 was over J3 
million kiloliters , and for heavy oil >~as 20 million kiloliters . 
The rapid rise in demand is attributed to the growth or the 
iron and steel and electric power industries. Tho prooent 
capacity tor refining crude oil is rated at l . l million barrels 
per day, and is expected to be 1. 9 million barrelo by 1965. 
Imports of crude oil in 1961 increased by 22% to 38 million 
kiloliters; nnd are extimated to oe 89 million kiloliters by 
1970. In 1961, crude oil was the largest single import com-
modity at $539 nillion, Presently, Japan has trade agreements 
14. WTIS , Part 1, No . 62-28, 7, 
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with the U. S.S. R. to tftport ) .~million kiloliter• 1n 1962. 
Tbe proportion or textile out~ut re?resentod by synthetics 
is more than 4~. Production of cotton and wool•n fAbrics 
incrauod 1n 1961, but ailk fabrics dropped . ·rext1les are 
atUl Japon'a loading export , although their relative importance 
haa dacl1nod. Tboy reproaontad )$ .6~ by value in 19$7, and 
clro·>ped to 29 .~~ in 1%0. It 1a e xp~tocl that cotton and • oolen 
producta will decline in importance , but aynthetica will expand 
ae new market are reacb~d . 
Other i nportant industries , primarily tor domaatic pro-
duction , include televiaion and electronic equipment , bCll sehold 
electr ical appliances , marino equipment , and optical goods . 
2. 2 Secondary Industries 
Japan's Lndustrial oraan1zat1on alsO COO?riaea a Wide 
Yarioty of secondary industriea. In the aggregate , t~ae 
activities are quito important as they provide amplo7=ent to 
a large number of' wcrkers and contribute s1gnit1c,.,tly to 
foreign sxohange earninga . Included are plywood, pottery and 
porcelain, toys , cultured pearla , watches and clooka, photo-
graphic equiJl"'ent , hardware , and a miscellany or sundry consumer 
goode . 
As many ot those products have achieved a ph~nomonal 
oxpanaion in production and •xports , particularly to the Uni ted 
States , the Japanese have instituted quantitative, price, and 
quality controls. s~e 1dea of the importance or those 1ndus-
t r1ea may be gained frOM considering tho value or their exports . 
In 1-160, pl,.ood exports totaled nearly $90 million, 1n 19$9, 
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optical and photographic equipment t allied $27 mi l lion ; in 
1959, pottery and porcelain accounted for $59 million; toys 
gained $77 million in 1595; and sundry goods are valued a t 
between $200 million and $300 million snnually, l5 
2. 3 Cao1t~ Investmont Structure 
On !<larch 31, 1961, Japan tallied ita Gross National Product 
(G!!P) for the f i scal year just ending and found an eminently 
respoctable $40. 7 billi on, 13 . 2~ above the total goods and 
services produced during t he previous year, and approximate l y 
$1.1 billi on mor e t han the government forecast . l6 By November 
of that year, the boom got out of hand and the government 
begen a program of tight credit and mild austerity. In spi te 
of this tightening up , the economy was able to execute a 
14.5~ jUIIIp to a GliP of about $48. 3 billion for fiscal 1961, 
How~ver , tht fqll efftets or tho restrictions will not be felt 
until March 1963, when GNP 1a expected to hit $50 billion, 
a moderate rise of about 5~. Accordingly , the government 
began easing controls around October of last yoar . 
The prinary fac t or which has been responsible for this 
gr owth since 1955 is pri vat e inves t ment in plant and equipment . 
Wi th the exception of relatively short r ecession periods , the 
economy has continued to experience a demand substantially in 
exceas of &upply . Consequently , investments b4vo been bri sk 
and bave spurred undertakings by related industries , thereby 
1$. WTIS , Part 1, No , 60- 41, 10-12. 
16. Conrad Fink, "~lay 1962 Survey of Japan ' s .,conomy and 
I ndustry, " FORl'UNE, May 1962, 194. 
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the lnt•rnatlonal Trade tlnd P~Y'Ients of Japan, ·' CEO (Washington , D. C. , Juno 1162) 
accelerating an already remar~ble growth . Industr ial produc-
tion has continued to r i se , 291 in 19$9, 23 . 7~ in 1960, and 
21.9~ i n 1961; and the index (195$ • 100) reached 286.5 
as of September 1961 . ~nis has been mot ivated primarily by 
the shift 1n the industrial otructure to heavy and chemical 
industries. 
There are a number of factors r es?onaible for this hign 
r a t e of private invest ment (25-30~ ot GNP) . Among the major 
ones : the nati onal income doubling planl7 to be fulfilled by 
1970; encouraging fiscal and monetar y policies ; and the nost 
significant, the urge to catch up with the technological levels 
of other industrial countries. This expansion has also been 
necessitated by the impending competition, which will result 
from the trade l iberal izat i on schedule. 
were : 
Tn93e 1ndu3tr1oe which attr~ctod significant investment 
(1) Industries which rationalized production facilitios 
to compliment tec~~ical innovation and ~oct trade libera-
lization. In this category may be found tho machinery 
industries , such as passenger ears and electrical equip-
ment , the oil refining and ?etrochemical industries . 
(2) Industr ies which expanded to meet increased demands . 
Not able ex~ples aro tbe electr1e power and iron and 
stoel industries. 
17. See Secti on J . l 
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(3) Industries which benefited from the income doubling 
plan and relevant financial policies. Noteworthy are the 
construction industries. 
At the OL~e time, medium and small enterprises have been 
encouraged by t he evident skilled labor shortage and the turn 
toward technological innovation to plan rationalization of 
their plants . In fiscal year 1961, national capital formAtion 
reached $1$.8 billion, an increase of 41$ . 7~ over 19$$.18 
Por a more expansive view of the economic statistics, refer to 
Table 2-1. 
Some rather significant structural changes have occurred 
within the Japanese industry since the early 19$0•s. Develop-
ments in the years 19$0-60 indicate that increases in the heavy 
and chemical industries, such as iron and steol , petroleum, 
and machinery , have outweighed those of thelisht industries, 
including textiles , paper pulp, and foods . Although the tex-
tile industry has by far the largest number of firms and W<rkers, 
and is thelargest earner ot foreign exchange, it is exceeded 
by t he chenicals and chemical products and machinery industries 
1n its contribution to GNP . As l ess and less emphasis is 
placed on the production of cotton textiles , this gap will 
slowly widen. 
The toxtile industry is, and will continuo to be , mostly 
comprised ot small and medium-sized ti,..s . llonetheleaa, the 
n~~ber of f irms with 30 or more employees i s increasing, and 
some of tho larger Japanese eatablis~~ents compare quite 
18. "Outlook on Japanese Economy, " INVESTOR'S DIGEST, 
October 1962, (Yama1ch1 Securities Co., Ltd., Jap~~) 
-23-
favorably in size, equipment , and output with large firms in 
other countries . The continued structural shift to the more 
captial- 1ntensive industries will extend the modernization of 
these enterprises, and will enhance the growth process or the 
entire industrial structure . 
2.4 Foreign Trade 
Changes in Japan's industrial structure are reflected in 
her foreign trade . Exports in 1961 were feat ured by a striking 
expansion of machinery shipments . The proportion represented 
by industrials and chemicals rose to 44~ by value as compared 
to 41% in 1960, while the share or light industrial products 
declined to 49. 6%. Textiles and textile products declined 
slightly, while met als and metal pr oduc t s were about the same 
as in 1960. 19 
On the otber s1do, crudo materials still compr1aod the 
largest percentage or 1mports , but machinery imports increased 
markedly because or plant modernization , expansion, and ration-
ali zation. Also indicati ve of the growing shi ft in tha i ndustrial 
struc t ure was the increased develop~ent of synthetic textile 
fibers , wnich require l inited quantities of imported rawmatoriala, 
The r ise 1n petroleum impor ts , especially crude oil fron Russi a, 
may be accounted for by the greater use of petroleum as a 
source ot domestic power and increaaed use as fuel and lubricant 
in the automotive and shipping industries . 
19. 
As i ndustr ial output and capacity have rison , the Japanese 
WTIS , "Eeon011lic Developments in Japan 1961, " ECONOMIC 
REPORTS, Part l , No . 62-28 (May , 1962) , 2-4. 
•••• 
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have increased their efforts to p~ote exports . A aajor role 
in tb1o activity is taken by the gove~ent , which aupoorts 
thea~ promotional efforts by providing export credit through 
the Japan ::;xport- Inp<r t Bank , tax incentive., , overseas trade 
contoro, fairs , and trade miaaions . Although thoro is no exact 
way ot aaaessing the worth ot these activitiea, it ia a credit 
to tho ocon"'"7 that .. x.,orto roae to $4. 2 b1ll1on in 1961 
(~mporta were $$. 6 billion) . (See table 2. 1) 
During 1961, oxporta to North ~erica fell . Practically 
all of the loss was duo to a drop of $ . 7~ in exports to the 
United States (about $1. 1 billion), whereas, Japan imported 
over $2 billion in AV~rican goods . This trade defioit was 
largely offset by a favorable balance with tho root of tho 
world and by a largo 1ncra ae 1n foreign inveatmant , both 
direct and portfolio. In errect, the capital account aad~ up 
tor tho deficit in the current account . !he Kitsui ,ank 
extimated that Japan would reg1ator a $286 million surplus in 
ite payment s bal ance for fiscal 1962, 20 Experts to Asia, 
Europe , and Africa increoeed an es timated 12, ZO, and 13 per 
cent, reepectively, while exports to Australia, New z~aland , 
and Oceania together dropped about 18~. Also, 1aporta frog 
North ~rica increased by )4 . ),, ~tdle thoae fro. the rost or 
the world rem•inod fairly conotant . 
Japan goes to gre• t lengthe to protect its ahara of the 
American market , and on nony occas ions volunt•r1ly reatr1cts 
oxporta or certain it•~• in order to placate certain aectora 
20. 1USIIIBSS lll!Eit , "Japan: trade gap or austerityf, • April 
14. 1962, 1o8. 
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ot American industry. These precautions may be explained by 
the apprehensions that Japan might eanehow be excluded from 
trade with the Co=mon ~mrket , The British Commonwealth, and 
the United States . On he r part, Japan has undertaken an import-
liberalization program, which will free by October , 1962 about 
90~ of imports based on the year 19$9. Although, 19$9 was not 
a very heavy year for imports , it i s still a step in the right 
direction, and future liberalization is expected. At the same 
time , Japan is attempting to broaden her trade zones . Invest-
mont in Southeast Asi a is a forerunner for an Asian c~~on 
market , with Japan as the nucleus. By 1961, trade with Red 
China was estimated at e6o million; about $180 million with 
the Soviet Union . Regardless , Japan sees her future trade 
ties with the West as expanding in concert with the growth of 
the -orld trade; and trade With the Communist countries as 
inereasing very slowl1• 
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Chapter 3 
PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC DP.VELOPHENT 
3.1 Ten Year Gr<>wth Plan 
-- -
In 19$7, the government drew up a five-year plan based 
on a 6~ to 7% growth in GNP. The rapid developments there-
aftor enablod goals to be attained by 19$9. Thereupon, a new 
ten- year program, 'known as the "Doubling National Income Plan, " 
was put into effect in 1961. This plan forecasts for 1970 
a GNP of $72 billion; and per capita income is expected to 
reach $579, based on a population or 102 million. Privat e 
equipment investment is estimated to reach $10 billion in 1970, 
and the domestic market will be expanded to accomodate a greater 
diversity ot consumer goods . 
To accomplish these goals, tho economy must expand at a 
rate averaging 6 .4~ a year . The growth is expected to be higher 
in the first half of the period. ~ne biggest expansion is 
planned for manufacturing, construction, and mining (9~ per 
year) , the lowest for agriculture , fishing, and forestry 
(2. 8%) , 21 This will provide employment for moro young ><>rl!ers 
entering the urban labor force , and al so absorb some of the 
excess tarn population . 
This expansion or industry must , or necessity, be accom-
panied by a growth in foreign trade . More industrialization 
will require increased imports, especially rnw materials and 
21. Consulate General of Japan , New York, "Japan's Economy, " 
PACTS ABOUT JAPAN (March 1962) , 5- 7 
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capital equipolent . On the other band, exports muat rile in 
order tO pay ror the larger YOlume or imports envisaged. The 
lncone doubling plan calla for exports worth f9 . 3 billion by 
1971, and imports of t9. 9 billion. 22 ro date Japaneae exp~ts 
havo riaen steadily so that they now constitute ) . $~ of the 
world's total international trade . Untortun tely, the trade 
gap between exports and tha aurging rlow or 1nports bas resulted 
tn oetbaoka in the country 1o growth. 
Moreover , the develOf""ent plan is not pertarrling as vell 
as bnd been expected . It io being criticized by bueineas circles 
tor creating unwarranted opt1niam that oparkod excess capacity. 
It appears that tbl major 1mpnct of the torecaet of steady 
srowtb has encouraged Ja~noee bua1nes~~·n to undertake rather 
a=bitioua investmenta. The raault bas been the ro~tion 
or two plans. One ia the tor=er progr~ tor the major industriea, 
aucb aa the chemical , machinery, and textlleo, tor 1970. Tho 
other improvised plan detl wltb the 1ncoce or households and 
buainooa firma , and their spending tor consumption and invest-
mont over the plan period . Unfortunately, planned output 
appears to exceed planned consumption and inveotmont. It the 
output plan is adhered to, incaao abould doUble in about 8 
or 9 yeara , rather than 10 years . 
This inconsistency 1ndicotee the weakneaa in the plan-
ning stagea. More than 20 co~ltteea , with their members 
22 , Conrad ?ink, op. cit., 197 
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drawn fro= ~usineas, goYern=ent, and acadoaic ~irolea, outlined 
scala for individual sectors of the econ~y. unfortunately, 
it appears that 41sasreenenta were not cOM?letely resolved. 
In the Japanese manner of doing things, it is better to ac~ept 
the inconsistencies rather than to obtain resolution through 
for~ing an asreement . The plan is presently revised within 
tho ~onoc1c Planning Agency , both to adjust to a ~uch faster 
sro~th or output in 1960 and 1961 than had been anticipated, 
and to resolve the inconaietency. Because of the political 
danger to t~e Prime Miniater, who is dependent fer future 
elections on the succesa of the plan, it seema that any ad-
juetment will aim at juggling some of the elementa to eliminate 
the 1nconsisteney. 23 
3. 2 International ?actors 
saentiall7, the plan ~t rely to a conoiderable extent 
on Japan's position as a trading nation. For smooth function-
ing or the nation's ocon~, exports will be called upon to 
delivor an impress ive increase of 8 . 7~ a year. However , this 
calls for freer imports of goods in return . For some time 
now, Japan has ma1nts1ned control• on 1m 'orts to protec t her 
foreign exchange reserves . Such controls are expected to ~~ 
eroaed aa a scheduled l1beraliaation program gees into effect. 
L~porta or fuels and rev aaterials , oxpecially thoae ~o1ng 
into highly techni cal products , are expected to achieYo atrong 
gain• · LikeWise , more imports or modern prooesa1ng machinery 
2) . Robert Z. Aliber , "Some Obaervations on the Jepanese 
Beon~. · CED (Nove~~er 19, 1962), 8-9. 
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are anticipated. With all ot this , the increased purchss1ng 
~·ower or the Japanese do~at1o 12arket will attroet z:ore cans=er 
goodo . 
By October 1962, Jnpan had freed from import restrictions 
9~ of tho value of her import• of 1959. Yet, she hao sub-
stituted an elaborete ayatem aa a defense against maoaive 
imnort ~onotraticn . ~ong tho tortificationa are: 
(l) All the incroaaea in i=por~s since 1959 and goods 
imported by state ~onopoliee are ~xempt fron the liberal-
ization progrBJD. 
(2) In several categories, specifications are ao worded 
aa to leave uncertainty ao to exactly what ia liberalized. 
13) New internal taxoa, aupposodly nondiscriminatory, 
have been i=posed en higher - priced liquors and autos 
or specified aize. And, 
(4) 1he government'• latent power to restrict imports 
and levy higher tariffs Will remain on the books . Already, 
a sizeable increase in tariffs has been 1~poeed upon 
goods ranging from apnleaauce to zinc . 24 
In this, one can trace certain ele~enta or the Japanese 
value ayate2 and way ot doing business . At present, the 
Japanese t ce considerable atr•in in attenptina to roco~cile 
the IMP-GATT (International Monetary Fund- General Agree•ent 
or Tariff Trade} comm1tmenta with their own internal problems. 
24· dUSIHess WZBX, "Japan: 14. 1962, 110. 
Trade Gap or Austerity? , " April 
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Tne basic Japane3e view is that protective measures can be 
adjusted downward, but only after the dornastic industries have 
been given an opportunity to become sufficiently competitive . 
CUrrently, this position is being hold in tho bast interests 
of medium and small si~ed finns who would be injured by freer 
imports . There is , however, sono contradiction here as many 
or the remaining e~hange licensing requirements apply m~e to 
the types of products made by large firns . This concern can, 
also , be extended to tho position of foreign branch pl ants, 
whoroin such branches might have tho advantage over Japenese 
firms in possessing cheaper capital, better management tech-
niques , and even less obligations toward the workers . Japanese 
products have encountered problems 1n entering foreign markets 
to a considerably greater extent than the products of other 
industrial nations , Such apparent unequal treaboent has sue-
gested that Japan has bean the victim of trade discrimination, 
which has taken the form of applying Article 35 of GATT to 
Japan, and so denying hor most- favored- nation tre ~tmont on 
tariffs.and quotas, the use of quotas on Japanese exports of 
particular product• by countries which do not invoke Article 
35, and the adoption or voluntary quota arrangements by the 
Japanese government or by Japanese trade associations to limit 
the volume ot oxports to foreign markcta. 
Although the general princi?los of GATT call for equal 
treatment , Article 35 provides two exceptions : (l) when a 
member joins GATT, it may be denied I~ treatment by alread7 
exiat1ng members ; (2) it , in turn, may rofuae ~~treatment 
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to thooe al.Nad7 ::>o!Dbers. •bon JaJB n joined GATr in 1956, 
14 :!ombore rotuaod her equal tl'"'!ltat:r:ent; alnco then, other 
countries baYa invoked Article 35 against Japan as tha7 adhered 
to GATT. 25 
Trada b• tween Japan and Article 3S nations is regulated 
bJ bilateral asroe..,nts . Other countriea, l1ko Ital7, which 
do not invoko Article 3S, l1!Dit trade with Japan through such 
trado nsroomonta also. It 1s d1tt1oult to dotorm1na exactl7 
t ho 1mpaot ot such !Donoures on Japan, as such bilatoral agree-
ments d1tter groatl7 tran country to country. llovortholoss, 
sene opti::>tam 1a '>~arrantod in •iaw or tho rocont doc1s1on ot 
Groat Britain to grant Japan Y.ost- .'aYorod- l:ation atntua •nd 
or ?r.nco to incroaao its quota on ll:lports tra:> Japan bJ 3~. 
Aa Japan asaumaa greeter sign1t1canca as a world trader, the 
ramainltlf' GATT ""'mbors should graduallJ accard her '.r'li st!ltus. 
3 . 3 De•~loping Conoorcial Policies 
Taking into consideration the present management environ-
mont in Japan, there are three factors which nrc gonorating 
major changes in tho traditional SJstom, without threatening 
overly to disrupt it. Firat, tho dom~atic cona~or narket 
has oxpondod great17, therob7 ll:lproving living standards and 
awakening bua1nosa and cove~nt executivaa to tho needs ot 
the tam11y. Second, a new generation or exacutives 1o beginn-
ing to aaauno control, porhops with leas roopect ror cont1nu1t7 
25. Robert z. Aliber, "Notes on the Internntional Trade and 
Payments of Japan, " C5I> (lfaahington, D. C., June 1962) 
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of the old customs than at any time since the introduction of 
industrialization a century ago . Toird , tho sheer complexity 
of competitive pressures and technological changes is forcing 
a reorganization of management and tho introduction of new 
systems of decision making. 26 
Tho rapid expansion and ~odernization of the industrial 
complex has boon made possible in large measure by foreign 
loans and technological assist&nco from foreign firr.>s . ;iith 
few exceptions, these benefits have aided essential industries , 
such as chemicals, machinery, metals, and textiles - all 
calculated to raise Japan's export potential and lesson her 
dependence on imported gooda . Productivity gains in induatry 
are attributed mainly to nore extensive use of capital equip-
ment and replace~nt of obsolescent and inefficient nachinery 
with modern units , improved managelllent and plant layout , and 
introduction of ne~ and more efficient industrial techniques . 
Further advances will be determined largely by tho availability 
of investment capital. 
A government study stresses the need for improve., nto 
in indus trial administration and rnanagenont and a step-up in 
industrial reeearch. The review suggests a need for an int&-
grated program of industrial area planning thQt QCcordo thorough 
consideration to transportation, power , and labor supp~y . 
It also notes an excess of manufacturing and diatribution firms 
in certain fields and recommends greater d1versity . 27 
26. Stanley S. Miller, "Traditional Features of Modem Business 
Hanagement in Japan," (1963) , 16. 
27 . WTIS , Part l , No. 60- 41, 2- 3. 
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In addition, it suggests that medium and small enterprises 
undertake a coordinated program to modernize plant f acili ty, 
expand technical research, and tm?rove management practices. 
As one of the foremost trading nations, Japan has developed 
an efficient distribution system. A large number of reputable 
trading fires, agents , brokers , and salesmen aro found in the 
principal commercial centers . As a matter ot tact, ~ost ot 
Japan ' s foroign and domestic trade is conducted through these 
marketing channels , rather than through sales departments of 
Japanese manufacturing firms . Cloae financial and organi za-
tional ties often exist between manufacturing plants , which 
may be located far from major cities , and these trading outlets 
in the large commercial centers . 
In the retailing field , most business is conducted by 
small shops which specialize in ono ot several related items . 
Also, there are an increasing numb4r ot depar~ent stores, 
which are quite similar to their &~erican counterparts. The 
importance of depart ment stores is increasing, and they are 
accounting for a growing share of the retail trade. Concurrently, 
a notable innovation in t he retail field has boon the intro-
duction of the installm&nt sale system. However, o. number of 
large indu•trial firms have extablished cooperative organiza-
tions to servo employees , also farmers and fishermen in rural 
areas . 
Advertising in Japan owes much to the tact that the nation 
has ono ot the highest 11 ternc:; rates 1n the world . t!edia 
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include ne~spa~rs, ~agaz1n a, r~dtos, tel~V1310n, billboards, 
direct mail , notion picturea, and bus and train poaters . In 
1960, the gross expenditure tor advertising waa t411 nillion. 
Nonetheless , it MUst be admitted that the Japanese have 
much to loam in marketing techniques. There is a sad lock 
or marketing research facilities, and the art or salosnnnahip 
muat be turtber refined. A. the de~a of the daoeatic 
conau=er market increase, tne bua1ness c~ity ~ill be torcod 
to adapt . In t3is yroceaa, 1Uch can be learned rro= roreisn 
oonoerne operating in Japan . 
).4 Future Trende 
On the one band, Japan ia in tho midst or nn internal 
boOM sparked by industrial expons1on, new construction, and 
• rioinp standard or living. On th~ other band, the hi~ rate 
or expansion periodically rorcea government r.eaouroa to restrict 
credit and to in?Qse cutbacks when tho wave o~ capital invest-
nont threatens to reduce torolgn currency rosorveD bolu~ the 
il. ) billion regarded aa a ~inimum. As of October 1962, tho 
governnont began easing th' latoot restrictions •• foreign 
exchange roserves climbed ateadily to f1 , 8 billion. 
5arr1ng an untoreseon diaaster , the gener•l outlook fer 
the economy is good ,28 Conditions 1m three major markets will 
aftoct tho tuture growth ot the economy: (l) tho United States 
is Japan ' s largest single cuat~~r, and ~o the prospects for 
AmeriGa will deternine thoue for Japan; (2) the Common Mar ket 
28. BUS~ 
Mov~ber 
WEEK, •JaE~ : Overheated Econom1 S~ra Down, " 
3. 1962, ~. 
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and the British Com=onwealth will have great effect on the 
trend of Japanese exporta; n4 (3) the s!ze or the Rusoian 
and Rod Chinese markets will have sane sig)11t1ct•noe . 
Granting that the assumptions of the Japaneeo planners 
about world conditions end daneatic trends aro sufficiently 
corroot, the chances are good that some portion or the plans 
(or 10010 <!og.'"$e or all or then) will be accccplhhed. Already 
Japan Ius changed be ·ond !=ag1nation 1n the last fifteen 
10ara . Today there is considerable accept"nce or the idea that 
Japan is entering a phase of an industrial revolution. l'his 
notion is broadcasted to the population through the use of 
masa media . Tnere is considerable involveMent with such con-
cepts as technological innovation, secular progress, and the 
welfare atate. Most tn,orti!Jit or all is tte gro .. :ng self-
eon!1denco a=ong the Japln,lt that t~o1 ..tll be equal to the 
demands of the ~odern industrial ~orld. 
Inflation nay bo a recurring headache , roro1sn ~•r~ to 
may raise restrictions to oxp~to , or excessive import• may 
upset the Bal ance ot PaY!II<·nta (BOP) but the ottitudea of tho 
ruling govern::ent party and the business c<X!IMunity are .. cored 
to tho eucceas or the economic developgent plan. In an7 event, 
the econ<>=7 proclises to re:uin stable tor oomo tl.>l• . Many 
1nduatr1ea atlll h~ve excees capacity, and with personal income 
expected to rise slowly, dOMestic demand should otay within 
bounds. 
In ~roapect is a gradual easing ot rostr1ct1ono on the 
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capital movements in nnd out of Japan. OVer the noxt few years , 
Japan is oxpectod to froo more importo frcm tariffs, and also 
further to relax current restrictions on foreign investment 
and the repatriation of capital invested in Japonoso stoeks. 29 
29. BUSillESS WE3K, "Japan: !;o Boom, llut Sto•dy Growth, " 
Poeembor 29 , 1962, 6~ 
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PART II 
ROLE MID STRUCTURE OF FORBIGN CAPIT•<L 
Chapter 4 
CLIMATE FOR PORSIGll Ih"VESTIIENT 
4.1 Government Policy 
Throughout the past century, foreign technology has made 
indispensible qualitative contributions to Japan's industri al 
economy. I t is very unlikely t hat Japan could support its 
population of 94.1 million without products and productive 
processes , along with scientific and manageri a l i deas , which 
originated abroad . ~lost Japanese exports , and a good portion 
of the domestic products, are manufactured goods whose very 
nature as well as methods or production have been derived 
fr= technical and cultural imports f rom abroad. 
Foreign capital has been less vitnl but, nonetheless , 
very inportant and shows up quite p~ominently in tho Balance 
of Payments (BOP) ledger - more prominently than do tochnolo-
gioal contracts. Captial imports have enabled Japan to finance 
a significant volume of foreign expenditures and foreign in-
vestments that would not have been possible otherw13e . 
Traditionally, the Japanese gover~~ent haa favored foreign 
investMent in the torm of loans and technological assistance 
agreoments on a royalty basis. These unlike equity arrange-
ments, enable the Japanese to retain control of tho enterprises. 
Thus , qu~titat1vely, the greater portion of forei gn capital 
to entor Japan has been 1n the form of ~ublic and private 
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loans and through contracts involving licensing of patents 
and t ransfer of technical in!' ormation and kno-•-how. "The 
Japanese have been determined , and show every evidonce of 
continued determination, to prevent foreigners from obtaining 
a significant degree of ownership and control, particularly 
in important sectors of the economy. •30 l1oreover, government 
officials oen exerciso quantitative and qualitative controls 
over the foreign 1nveat~nt progrnm more easily through loans 
than with equity capital. 
Although there have been mordifioations in the official 
attitude since the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law 
in 1950, the Japanese gov•~~ent nnd business cOCMunity are 
>till fAr from ready t o l et the forces of the market and •~­
petition dictate . As it stands now, everything in the economic 
sector can be planned beforehand, and each official can keep 
track of his area of responsibility. ro lift all controls , 
even gradually, would make it impossible for the government 
to exerc ise even a benign foro ot supervision. 
The government habitually intervenes in negoti ations 
between Japanese and for eign fi~s to insist that the cash 
downpaymont be oliminat od , t he royalty rate lowered, the fees 
reduced, and the equity participation by the foreign finn 
slashod. Today, the government fr~"DS on royalties greater 
than 2 .5~, technological assistance contracts or over 5 yoars , 
or foreign equity participation over 25%. The Foreign Invest-
30. U.S . Dept . of Co~~erce , IN~STMENT I~ JA?AN (1956) , l . 
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ment Law of 1950 has been the basis for control over entry 
from abroad of technology, loans , and equity investment . To 
sain remittance and repatriation proviloges, a project must 
pass a sevGro tost, which stresses the contribution to tho 
industrial econ~ and tho BOP. 
Tho l1inistry of Finc.nce has viewed rather skeptically 
the faot that the $568 million or private captt~l in tho f~m 
of loons and otoek purchasoa which entered Japan up to 1958 
has required repatriation or interest, principal, royalties , 
and fees to the ~~ount of $4~ million, Also, 1n fiscal 1962-
63, $300 million or nora will be required to service the total 
capital investment as or 1962. 
Quite 9robably, the main reasons for th& traditional 
restriction of the entry of foreign capital and tec~-~ology 
are: (l) the 10 million unemployed or undere~ployed; (2) 
the great mass or cottage industries; (3) fear of excessive 
foreign competition and control; and (4J the lack of self-
confidence in dealing •~th foreigners . Any vigorous investor, 
foreign or Japanese , whoso activities might u;>set the del icate 
balance of the industrial system and create more unemployment , 
or any technological sdvance which might similarly disrupt 
tho working• , will continue to be closely controlled, no matter 
what steps toward liberalization Japan offocta. 
The most unt~tunate aspect of thia situation is the 
gove~ent ' s failuro to study seriously how the nation could 
alter its induotrial system so aa to be more receptive to 
\/estern capital, modern technology , and vigorous c0lllpet1tion. 
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Instead of using its influence and controls of domestic cor-
porate activity and financial structur& to begin such adjust-
ments, the l~nistry of International Tr3de and Industry uses 
them largely to restrict internal competition, and thus rigidify 
the existing system. 
4 . 2 General Status of Foreign Cn~ital 
Until 1950, American aid - moatly government loans -
dominated the capital inflow scene. Since then thoro hes boon 
an increasi ng flow or foreign technology, some equity invest-
ments , and substantial bank credit , plus a good doal or 'public 
borrowing. Through 1960, the total accumulation of foreign 
liabilities wus $2. 4 billion. At f irst, tho flow was slow, 
llith only $14 million by 19.50. However, the passage of the 
For ei gn Investment Law i n 1950 brought the total to $670 ~llion 
in 1954. It rosa to $1, 319 million by 1957, and then to 
$2, 394 million by 1960 . 
Host of this ca. pi tal has been in the form of short-term 
loans and credits , tied closely Hi t h the flow of inports . 
Since mid-1960 , there has been a number of deposits received 
from abroad, attracted by high interest rates and the ready 
convertibility of f r ee yen accounts . Another important form 
of ahort-te~ capital import has been bank borrowings. Aa of 
1961, the El<port- Import Bank of \;nshington hed extended a total 
of $274 million to finance various Japanese ventures . 
Howover, it is long- term capital movements which are 
imporennt to this thosis . Tho largest importer of foreign 
-41-
long-term capital has been the Japanese government. At tho 
end of !1arch 1961 , the Japanese government had a total of 
$1. 5 billion in foreign obligations . Only a omall portion 
of this included businessdebts , as few such obligations obtain 
a govcrnmont guarantee •non tho lenders are private. (See 
Table 4-1) 
Foreign private investments in Japan have increased 
recently , especially since 1961. The follo•~ng factors ~ay be 
cited as responsible: (1) the high growth rate of the economy, 
(2) the pressing need for Japaneoo fi~s, in the f ace of trade 
liberalization, to modernize their equipment and technology 
through tieups with foreign firms , and (3) recent easing of 
government restrictions on foreign investment . The most 
significant fonn of investment has been the technological 
assistance agre~ent - 1,836 as of September 1962 (See Tab~ 
4-2) , The second most important fom is private loans, ><hich 
totaled $1, 217 million at tho end of 1961. Sane >~ere for a 
short period of time , but others ran to 10-yoar poriods. 
Equity investments wero slow at first, but speeded up 
after regulation• were relaxed in 1960. The totn1 value as 
of July 1961 was $194 million, of which 56% was tied up with 
foreign participation in management . American invostors accounted 
for tho greatest portion of the validated investment• involving 
management participation, 74% as of March 1961. The British 
accounted tor 7~; Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 6%; and Canadian, 
and Dutch investors , 2~ eAcbJl 
These investments are pr1mar11; in the srowth industries. 
About 37~ in the potroloun 1nduatrr, 28~ in chom1cala, 16% 
in machinerr (esopoicall; electrical and e~otronic equipment), 
8~ in rubber and leather products , and S~ in metAls . Among 
tho trGditional in~uatr1oo with very little foreign inves~ent 
are cotton nnd ~oolen to~tilos >hicb account for onl; $870, 000. 
Actually, foreign ~anoga=ent control is o~tro~ol; limited. 
Only in the oil i~ustries are thure instances or over 2S{ 
control. In only four other induatries does foreign ownership 
e~coed S~ (See Tabl e 6- 6) . 
Equity investments hove included not only direct invest-
menta , but ~lso purchases b7 individuals ot ox1nt1ng Ja~anese 
oh&roe . S~lsrly, •~ ccrpor&to bonds hove Joined •ho otocko 
in tbo foreign ~one; m.rkota . 5onof1c1arr cortificat a, on 
the other hand, notted onl; fl . )8 mil~on b; March 1960. 
As mentioned, tho ~cot im~ortnnt facet of all foreign 
investment has been the introduction of foreign technology. 
Aa in tho case of equity investnonts, tho greatest portion 
baa boon 1n the heavy and chemical industries, m<cbinory and 
~~tala which in the aggregate accounted for 84~ or the total. 
In 63~ or the cas~a, the source was the Un'ood ~tatoa, 9% from 
& at G rman;, 7~ from Swit- rland, and lS~ free other EUropean 
countriea. 32 Tne results of this imported technolog; are not 
31. W. S. Hunsberger1 "Capitol and Tecbnolog;" CED Rorort February 16, l9b2, 20. 
32. Ibid. , 27-28. 
Fiscal : 
Yos.r 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
TOTAL 
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TABLE 4-1 
Long- term Foreign Investment in Jnpan 
Based on Poreign ~change Validations 
(IUllions of dollars) 
Stocks : Investment: Bonds : LOans : 
Trust 
3. 2 
-
13. 3 4· 3 
10. 1 0, 1 34. 5 
5. 0 0, 6 49.4 
4 . 0 0. 1 15. 3 
5.1 0.1 47.1 
9. 5 0.1 93. 7 
11. 5 0. 1 1.24. 0 
11. 4 0. 1 231. 5 
27. 0 0. 2 127. 6 
74. 2 0.6 127. 1 
115. 9 1. 3 0,1 387. 6 
290. 1 3. 2 0. 2 1, 241. 6 
TOTAL 
3. 2 
17.4 
44.8 
$4. 9 
19 . 3 
52. 2 
103. 3 
135.6 
243. 0 
1$4. 9 
201. 9 
504. 9 
1, 535. 2 
Sour<~e : Dopo.rtmont of State Airgram from Al:lerican Embassy 
Tokyo, July 25, 1962, 2. 
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TABL.E 4- 2 
Number or Contracts 
1959 1960 1961 1950- 61 
Electrical Hachinery 3li. 8$ 72 37l 
Transportation Mnchinery 4 16 25 107 
Other ~~ch1nery 35 $3 106 389 
l~etal and t!etal Products 21 21 32 155 
Chemicals 25 68 62 3li.O 
Spinning and Weaving 7 6 18 61 
Others 7 29 36 171 
'l'OTAL 133 278 353 1,614 
Source : Foreign Capital Reoearch Society, FOREIGN INIGS'I'llENT 
Ill JAPAJf 1962 (Tokyo , Bank or Japan , 1962) , ll, 
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easily tallied in ~onetary fore ; but , ar& reflected in more 
end better quality products, lower coots, rationalization of 
industry, And growing exports . 
4.3 Changing Attitudes 
There has been scme i~provement in the Japanese policy 
toward foreign investl:lent . Tho larger fims, nou beginning 
to venture abroad themselves \'l'ith direct investmonta, sense 
the need for reciprocity . Increasing nressure is being put 
on the government by Japanese businesstten to relnx restrictions 
on capital entry. 
It 1s essential to understand >~hat benefits ••ill accrue 
to Japan Hith the freer entry of capital. For ono thing, 
pa~nts of interest, royalties, and fees for technology, which 
must be paid whether tho company i s p~osporing or Dot, are 
Roro bur4ensome than 41v14en4a geared to tho prof1t level , 
Further, reinvestment of earnings by foreigners bas found little 
opportunity end so foreigners are forced to re~t their earn-
ings . Another foreseeable problem lies in the oroa of research 
end development . Unless Japan allows froer movement or tech-
nology, sho will not be able to keep abreast of industrial 
competitors 1n the ~lost . 
Ono noods only to point to th~ benefits reaped by such 
nations aa Dritain and Bo~land rrao direct foreign investments 
in order to demonstrate tho valuo in bolstering tho BOP. 
As1de from providing employment for many nationals , thoao 
investment• earn $392 million for 9ritnin every yoar. In 
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addition, a nucber or ~~rican conp~es are easer to set up 
o;>erotiona 1n Japan eo an ex· ort base. U lOOJ'..o>l':led t'creign 
subsidiaries were allowed in, ther would bring along not onl1 
capital , technolo~, and manaaorial skills, but experience 1n 
merchnndi ai ng , promotion, advert ising, and selling, which 
Japan noeda so badl r , Japan ~ight ronlize its potential ns tho 
induatr1al cantor of .~1 more re dily with the asaistance or 
foreign fi~.33 
All or this has made t considerable 1mpreso1on on tho 
Japanose gove~ent. A r econt notable change haa been the 
introduction of two new categories of validations (which are 
necessary for re~ittnnco or earnings and repatriation of capi tal -
see chapter 6) . Each receives less scrutinr , and thus faster 
a'prov•l, than under for=er ;rocedures . However, absolute 
suuantee of profit and earn<.ngs accord~ to a definite 
schedule is no longer aYailable . The ult1n4te tr'"ater depends 
on the BOP.oituation. 
At pr esent , total foreign purchases or oxioting sharos 
are limited to 15~ or a oampany ' a out •tanding 3tock, except 
in certain re3tr1cted fields , ouch as bankin&, transportation, 
inouronce, nd ~ublic utilitiea, ~~ere tho 11mit is 1~. 
Perhaps the ~•t significant indication or fUture l1barali:n-
tion waa tho decision or tha Mlniatrr or Pinance to cut the 
waiting period on w1t hdrowala or non- re•ident tunda inveoted in 
priv&to Japanese companioo to 6 ~onths ns or August l , 1962. 34 
)). 
34. 
Bus 1nos s Interns t1 onAl, op. ei t ., 21:.- 27. 
Internstional Commerce , "Japan's 2eonaoic Boo= ->la ckens , 
But U. S. Sales OUtlook Good, • October 8 , 196. , 54. 
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Still, there exist two somewhat antagonistic attitudes 
in Japan concerning foreign investment. On the one band, there 
is groat reluctance to share with foreigners any of the employ-
mont and profit of the Japanese economy, and ospecially to 
share managerial functions . On the other hand, there is a 
fear ot tho superior busineos capability of foreigners and the 
accompanying competition. Tbe expcrionce of tho Singer sewing 
machine compa.'ly, 3S which has been trying to break in, is a 
good example of this type of thinking , 
Along >tith the increase in capital and technology inflow, 
service payments aro rising. In 1960, the total c~ to 
$197 million. Of this, only $22. 8 million was for equity 
capital, while $84 million went for royalty payments . (See 
Table 4-3} . Indications nre that dividends would presa.'>t 
less pressure on the torei gn oxchange reserves , Yet, ?rotection-
ist attitudes still prevail, 36 
Nonetheless, the rathe r rapid increase in foroign invest-
ments since 1960 reflec t s a growing interest and confidence 
by forei gners in Japan, ns well aa a greater recept ivity among 
the Japaneso . Presently, validations aro easier (though still 
subject to the government•s nec.onomic contri0ut1on11 tosts) 
and ~ore shares ore being aold both to individuals and juridical 
persons . 
35. See Section 9- l . 
36. W, S. Hunsberger , op . cit., 29- 30. 
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4.4 Motivation 2£ Foreign Funds 
~ae prosonoo ot a business-oriented consarvat1ve govern-
ment, the rapid growth of a consumer market , end well managed 
monetary policies 1<hich have led to a high degroo ot economic 
stability despite the rapid growth, aro all incentives for 
foreign companies to enter this narket or 94. 1 nillion consumers 
and the 800 million market in Southeast Asia . This nation's 
industrial might has n~de it the second largest market for 
Uoitod States exporters after Canada. Japanese technology, 
in general , is still tar behind that or its 'tlestern competitors . 
So, also , are its marketing skills which are so essential to 
the marketing of nanutactured exports . 
Japan is encountering stiff price competition from India 
and Hong Kong in tcxtil-s and other goods . Its steel and 
machinery prices aro often higher than those of its competitors 
in the West, as the producers lack sooe of the nodorn technology 
required . This nood for assistance is illustrated by the four 
or five technological assistance arrangeroents which Ya>~atn 
Steel Co. makes every yeor with American firms, such as U. S. 
Steel, A. O. Smith, and Amoricnn Can. Japanese ousinoosreen 
contend that, as Asians , they can do a better job of selling 
to other ASians . Yet , there is much room for development 1n 
their marketing and oelling techniques . 
~ao flow ot private foreign venture capital is motivated 
primarily by tho profitability of the inve3tnent opport~~ity . 
The rate ot flaw depends, to a large extent, upon a country 1 
' investment climate - including its development program, its 
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political and eccnQQ!c ata•ility, and its ability to =eet its 
foreign cur:-ency cCDIOl. t=enta . Althougll the prilul7 lliC ti v!lt~ 
factor tor nest companies ia the anticipation or ~~di•te 
profit , the desire to ~onetrato new foreign m~rkota r ates 
extremely high no a oupplomontary goal. 37 
Japan aooacodatea both requirement• . Tho increased invoat-
mant by Ar.orican companies during the paot tow JOare 1a n 
good indication or tho opti=istic oxpectationo. ~oroovor, tho 
lens- range .:ros!)ects tor Je.pan and tho ont:.re South.oast ;\s1a 
are encouraging many foreign f1rns to invest on tho bcsis or 
futuro returns . This type or investment has aloe boon greatly 
stimulated by the recent re l axing or 1nvestr.ent restrictions . 
4.5 Contributions of Foreicm C\l>it·<l 
It hae been US· rtod tho.t although the flow cf foreign 
capital has been relatively s=all comp&r$4 with Jap~~·• total 
investment , i• is ~uito doubtful that Japan could have achi oved 
a baro level or subsiotonoo without the help or foreign teeh-
nology. 38 For a nation which must trade to live, it is 1n-
parat1ve that he r industrial complex be maintained nt on 
efficient and co~petitivo l•vel . With the preaont shift 1n 
the industrial structur' fro:. tho traditional light industries 
to the heavy and che~cal industries, Japan r.uat ~ort the 
latoat r~nults of ~odern research and development which ·~~ 
cannot Afford hersolt. 
)6. 
Harry J . ~obinson, "Tho Motivation and F'low of I'riv•te 
Foreign InvestMent (Stanford Reseoreh Institute, 1961),~. 
W. S. Hunsberger, op. cit., 1. 
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In view of the already high rate of capital investment 
(25-30~ of GNP), she nust seek additional capital abroad in 
order to finance her cconomdc development plen. Especially 
burdens~• ~ill be the growing volume of needed projects of 
tho social overhead type . In addition, industry Will require 
both funds and cap!t~l goods to enable it to expand at tho 
anticipated rate of 6 .4~. Cn top of this thoro is a growing 
pre~sure for loans, investments, and grants to other ccuntries, 
especially in underdeveloped Southeast Asia. 
To finance these activities, Japan must seck help from 
foreign capital sources . Howover, the lL~it on such capital 
will not be set by the amount required, but by the capacity of 
the BOP to support service pa~~nto . If foreign exchange 
earnings remain at a high rote nnd if the economy continugs 
on its progressive growth, the confidence of foreign lenders 
and investors will bo maintained. In the future, Japan will 
be turning increasingly to the private capital markets abroad , 
rather than to governmental and intern.~tional financi al insti-
tutions . 
Chapter S 
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AliD POLICY 
$ . 1 ~!onett>ry Policy 
The Bank o! Japan, PStablisbod in 1882, is the central 
bank with sole authorization to issue banknotes . It regulates 
the currency and controls credit in lino with government policy. 
Fifty- five per cent ot its capital is subscribed to by the 
government . Almost no transactions are negotiated with indi -
viduals or business firms other than financial institutions. 
There is no reserve requirement, but non- intorostbearing 
current deposits are accepted from financial institutions. As 
accumulated capital is vory scarce, and because the postwar 
modernization bas necessitated heavy borrowing by commercial 
banks fr~ the Bank ot Japan , there is currently an "overloan• 
situation; and such current doposi t balances are small . Host 
of the Bank's bo~d holdings are government bondo; and all of 
the transactions in these bonds carried out directly with 
individual financial institutions. Since the amount of buying 
and selling is so small, there has been no opportunity tor 
open market operations ~ 
The Bank acts as a depository, ~~thout interest, ot 
governmont funds . With the pormiosion of the ~!inistor of 
Finance , certain deposits are designated to be placed with 
financial 1nsti tutiono . These funds are interest- oearing and 
may bo lonned out . The government ' s deficit tinancing is 
usually accompli shed by tho 1oouance of bonds, which are 
relatively short-torm (!)years at $ .47S~ per annum) .39. T.~ese 
39. u.s. Dept . ot Commerce , op . cit ., 38 
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bonds are bought only by the Bank, because ot the unattractive 
interest rsteo as compared to 1nveatmento paying 8~ or core. 
Cradi t control 1a based on a cca:;>11eotocl oyetam of mcney 
rateo . rhe commercial ~anks can profit only by borrowing 
rr~ the onk or Japan at an ottioial rate which ia lower 
than their lending rate to custam.ro . Aa a lim~t to th~ amount 
allowed eaob bank, the Bank or Japan sots a borrowing ceiling, 
and all loans in excess are penalized ot a higher i nteroot 
rate . Or, another method is by rabinl' the rediscount rate, 
which is often done during a Salance or Payn•nt crisis . 
PreaentlJ, tb~ro is consideration among sovernm.nt circles 
for a U>t ~hd rate system and other ret1n_,ts in tbe en&ire 
banldng a:ro te:o. 
$. 2 For•ign ~change ?r~scoti~• 
Tho I'J.niatry or Finance det• r:oines wbich commerical banks 
rnay engage in roro1gn transactions, which include tho buying 
and aellinp or foreign currency and tho issuance or lott>rs or 
credit . Thoro are two types or such banks in Japan: Class A 
and Cla .. B. Tho fer mor a!'O those bruUu which are •llo>~ed to 
conclude correa~ondent contracta with foreign bor~a . In this 
catee;orr are 12 Japanese ~anks and 14 rorei(UI banks with 
branchaa in Japan \4 are t.:oorican) . 40 In th I claas are 
21 Japoneao tanks ~~Jch ~ ~nz•ge 1n various roro!gn exchane;e 
act1v1t1ea , exelu.ive ot correa;ondent r.lat1oneh1ps. 
40. ilriS, !'art 1, J;o . 62- 61 (Auguat l962), 14 . 
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In 1954, the ?oreign .;xchange E=k La• vu tnacted. '7nis 
low AUthori%ed the Minister or Finance to license a bank, or 
banka, to specialize in foreign exchL~o tronoootlons and 
foreign trade financing . Presently, thero is only one b~~k 
which enjoys this privileged position. Th8 Bank ot Tokyo, 
with< 1omestic branch orricea, 16 foreign oraneh.s , and 
16 representatives abroad , la tho only bank designated as a 
the depository of tho H!nilt%7 of Finance !or ita foreign 
currency funds , and as tho !isc•l agent for tho govtrnr.ont 
in connection with the aottlenent or Japonose ;xternal Loan 
llonds . 4l 'Nith authorized capitol ot $28 million, tho b:.nk 
negotiates the lorgoat porcent•ge of Japan's international 
bonking business . 
~. foreign b nka engage in custonary ox~ort-irn~ort 
servioea under applicable Japanese benkins lawe and tr~dt and 
exchange regulations . Included are depository, aatekee>ing, 
and remittance services , as well as naking operfltional yen 
loans, selling foreign currency drafts , transmitting orders 
tor purchase and sale or aocurlties abroad , an extending 
ohort-te~ dollar eredita to Japanese firms, authori,ed poroons , 
an:! foreign !'irma in Japan. 
S. 3 ~ Lnd LPJst:..rance P1nP-"lc1nq 
Tho shortage or •••1lable liquid rur~. ia 80 great that 
the International Monotary Pund does not oven 11at in its 
41. Bank or Tokyo, ~USIN&SS G7IDE (Sopt«Cber 1960) , 1- 2, 
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nonthlr bulletin tho total ~t of caah htld by tho private 
bankinv ,,., tom. 'l'he c=erc1a: bt.nks ar• co:lsistontl:J over-
loan d, and are constantli rediscounting notes with the 3ank 
ot Ja9an or borrovicg :~ each other. Money ia so tight that 
aan:J United Statoa firms , :anutacturing in Japan, do not even 
trr to oecuro wor financing othor than overdraft facilities 
!rom the c~orcial banks , which do not d1scr1M1n•to in their 
industrial lending against forc1gn- controllod firms . Occasion-
ally , they borrow frOM the branches Of the ~Orlean banks , 
but.gonorolly thor cl~ better service and terms frau the 
Japanese banka. 42 
Japan'a ord1narr c~rcial banks corroapond to the coc-
JCorclal ani uvlnga banks in the i::Uted Shtea and S\l.rope . 
Xore than halt ot tho loan and deposit bua1noss 1a transacted 
br ton l•rgo bonks . The banks are required br law to sot 
aa1do reaorvos ot ton per cent of nrotlt before dividends are 
declared, but thoro 1a no arrangemont comparable to the Federal 
Reserve System in the Un1tod Stateo, whereby the Bank of Japan 
might control credit . 
Generally, manufacturers mar obtain una• curod lonna at 
about 8~ . However, the banks must reserve th• r1;ht to rocall 
such loana instantly, 1D viev o~ the contral b nk'a 1owor to 
=anlpulete tho price and supply of =on•J· Nov rtholosa, it 
is a tact that banks dislike torecloetn& on a borrawer, and 
•~11 reaort to increased loans, and to aolioit!ng buaineaa for 
42. tlua!noao International, op. cit., 59. 
the £irm in order eventually to collect tho £ull amount . 
Ae a resul t ot tho historio•l t i eup botw•en banke •nd 
1nduatrr in the Z lbatsu caabi~a, the tren~ has boon toward 
a renewed alignment between individual bnnka and 3pecific , 
large corporetiona. It is quite true today tha~ the benkers 
have a atrong voice in manago~nt or the concerns. Ma1ut~ctur-
ers c.,.. lain that th requir• ~osita ar forcing a firm to 
maintain exeossivo funds Hith o creditor b~nk and, in reality, 
the &aount or the lo~n. tor Which £ull interest is charged, 
1s thereby redaced . Tb1s de~endence or J•panese c ncorns on 
the bonks and other financial institutions is illustrated by 
the nation's £1nanc1al statistics . In !lac .1 1957, corporate 
reinv•e~nt profits account~d tor less t~ 40% or c1 pi tal 
resoureee, while industrial loane which w•re £unneled through 
tho banks , were almost exactly 40%. lloarly 85~ of the debentures 
issued by enterprieee wore subecribed to by financial inotitu-
tions; and these organitationa, also, hold ~ore than 20~ ot 
tho corporate stocks in 1958.43 In 1957, 73~ or the neoots 
held by individuals wore in the tonn ot banks deposita, while 
only 16' went into aecuritiee. Alt~ough th, recent drive en 
stock sales by the "ojor securities houses has ~oderatod those 
figures, th• influence ot the banks is still onormous . 
In ad t tion to t~ abov<l) or :.1na.""Y banka, there a.re 1,1ben-
ture- 1eeu1ng banke which su•plJ relatively long-term £unds . 
43· lb1d • • 60. 
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The baaic difference bctwe•n tbe two is that the long-ter= 
banks are ~e~tted to accept denosits only ror= ~he govern-
nent , loc•l public organizations , and their cl'enta . onder 
the preoont rules , those banks may issue up to 20 tines the 
total of capital end reservoe . ~~ong this group are several 
quasi-governmental bonka . 
Another source or capital, amall though gre~ing in recen" 
yeara, is the credit association. Included are mutual loan 
and aavinga b&nks, vhicb ar• authori:ed to accept deposits 
and n•ke loans to no~~enbora . 
Honking behind tho c~orcial bonks and tho ~1n1stry of 
Finance ' s Trust Fund Bureau as capitol sourcea, are tho life 
inaurRnce companies which are made up of 20 life and 20 nonlife . 
In addition, tho~ ar~ 3h tore1gn nonlife !nsuranco concerns 
(or Wbicb 8 are L~ericnn) . The principal portion or the assets 
ot tho Japanese lite insurance concerns are in the torn or 
loana, and the balance consleta ot securities and renl estate . 
$.4 Public Financing 
Accordi.ng to the Constitution, the Cabinet 1a responsibl e 
tor preparing the national budg t and subnitting it to the 
leg1alature !or ap~rowal . Moreover, taxes c~ be imposed or 
=oderated only by leg1alative action of the Diet . Acutal 
pre >&ration o~ tho budget ia in the hands of the admlni•tra-
tive branch; nnd the Ministry of Finance works it up for the 
fiacol year from April 1 to March 31. 
Tbe general account, which includes all revenue and dis-
burae~nta , is toe principal part or the bu~get . In addition, 
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there is a special account which covers the operations of 
various governmental enterprises. Tho pos t war fiscal policy 
of the government has been characteri•ed by large deficit 
financing. Huch of this in the early years has been covered 
by international loans , but recentl y the new sy~tem of tax 
collection has provided a significant amount of revenue . 
The budget for fiscal 1962 (ending ~larch 31, 1963) 
includes a general account of $6. 7 billi on and a special account 
of $2. 3 billi on . 44 In spite of announced reductions in indirect 
t axe s , annual rGvenue i s expec t ed to increase sornewbero between 
$975 million and $1.6 billion. 
Dos,ite plans to concentrate national t1nenc1ng , no 
ef fort as yet has been made to redueo local government ~xpend ­
itures . Lack of control by the central government has resulted 
in a high degroe of overstaffing and a~bitious public wor ks 
programs i n the prefectures . Presently, totnl local govern-
ment expenditures are only slightly below those of the national 
government . 
Vari ous f i nancial inst itutions have been established by 
tho government to supplement private financial institutions. 
The mos t important of those is the Japan Dovelo~nt 3enk, 
which f inances improvement ond cx~ansion of faci liti es by 
direct loans and purchases of corpor ate debentures . Tb.e Bo.nk 
has c oncent rat ed its lendi ng in the eloetr1e po~er , marit~e , 
coal mining , iron and s teel indus t r i es . Another i s t he Export-
44. WTIS , Part l, No . 62-28, 9 . 
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Import Bank of Japan which finances foreign t r ade and over seas 
investments . The Housing Loan Corporati on , the Agriculture , 
Forestry, and Fishery Finance Corporation, and the SmaE 
Busi ness Finance Corporation add t o thi s group of jur i d ical , 
f i nancial insti tutions . 
Among t he non jur1d1col bodi es are t he Trust Fund Bureau, 
the Industrial Investment Special Account, and the Foreign 
Exchange Fund Special Account, all or which ar e under the 
~!inis try of Finance . The importance of the Trust Fund Bureau 
is i llust rated by the foot that it commands an account second 
only to t he bank funds in value . 
In the entire financial area, the gove~~ent has complete 
control . I t maintains rigid bonking and loan regulat ions , 
and can manipul ate the pri ce and supply of money. In addit i on, 
the vari ous bureaus of the governMent naintain close control 
t hr ough contact tvith bAnking and corporate exeoueivos , and 
can persuade them to toke such action as tho bureaucrats think 
necess .2lry. 
As of July 1961, interest r ates averaged as foll ows : 
prime r ate , 6 .93$~; discount rate on import trade bills and 
impor t freight bi lls , 4. 38~; call money , 8 .03%; government 
bonds , 6 . 432~; and corporation bonds , 7 .61%. 
$ . $ Taxation 
Corporat e and noncor porat e business income and personal 
1nco~e , earned in Japan , are subJect to national and local 
gove~~ent taxat ion. A convention f or the avoidance of 
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double taxation has been negotiated between tho United States 
and Japan . 
Corporate business profits are subject to a corporation 
tax, an enterprise tax, and an inhabitants tax, the total of 
which amounts to a combined percentage of SO . ~9 corporation 
tax is levied by the national government and is about 38%. 
The enterprise tax is imposed by the prefectural government 
and amounts to 12:1(. Tho prefectural inhabitants ourtax amounts 
to 13. $% of the corooration tax. 
Noncorporate business profits are also subject to the 
same t~~es ; although rates run n bit higher . 
Japanese personal income taxes are considerably higher 
than those in the Unitod States. In addition to the national 
income tax, foreigners must pay prefectural and municipal 
income taxes , Whereas a man earning 1:>101 000 l.n the United 
States pays about $1,$00 in tax, he would pay roughly *3, 632 
1n Tokyo.4$ It is true that unearned inc~ from non-Japanese 
sources, not renittod to Japan, will not be taxed by Japan 
until the man has been a resident of Japan for 5 years . But , 
many personnel plan to stay longer. ~Conresid,nts who r-enain 
for less t~~ a year are taxed at a flat rate of 20~ on all 
profits in Japan. In oons1deri~ these high ta.~ rates, 1t 
must be born& in mind that the average Japanese executive 
receives a good portion of his salary in nontaxable fringe 
benefits. 
45. WTIS, Part 1 , No . 59- 2, 10. 
- 61-
In addition, the Japanese have a law which makes it simple 
for them not only to increase taxation of export earnings , but 
also to force an 1ncreoso in the price of exports . This law 
is especially important to a United States company thnt is 
seeking to minimize tho oorninga of its Japanese subsidiary 
by selling exports a t roduced prices to anothor foroign affil-
iate. In cases or dispute, the burden or proof lies ~ith the 
corporation. A wholl~•ned suboidiaro i s quito clearly a 
family corporation (a closely-held ownership), even though 
the parent corporation may be widely held . Another burden is 
the i nequitable retained earnings tax, whoroby excessive 
cause must be given tor the retention ot earningn in order to 
avoid the tax . 
5 . 6 Capit•l Market 
Since ~anka tra~1t1onallJ handled those functions •h1ch 
are usually performed in the nest by the securities market, 
the development of a Japanese securities market has been slow. 
At firs t, stock salos were only through spot transactions but , 
since :·!ay 1951, margin transactions have been permitted \although 
not to foreigners} . 
Presently , there are no transactions in Government bonda 
or in eorporato debentures, but there is a move to~.vard a 
moderato de enturo :market . H'ouever, it doos not seom that, 
with tho present r~tes or return , bonds or dobenturG3 cm ld 
nt present conpeto favorably within tho growing securities 
market . 
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Securities dealers not only bUJ ~d sell aeeur1ti s, but 
aro authorized to Wlderwr1 te various ty;Jes ot cor, ,orate :sceur-
1t1es, subject to reg1atrat1on regulations . In addition to 
expanding operations >~Hhin Japan , the dealers htlVO goM over-
aoaa (current ly, tho four major houses h~ve officea in New 
~ork and in other foreign cities) . A total or ?.S million 
waa sought by puol1c aalea of the J~pan ?und ccn=on stock in 
the tln1tod States. To date , Sony Co:;>. has •old stoc:: unler 
the ~~r1can Depository ~oceipt system tor a total of 3.5 
n1111on . Toshiba, Ltd , hnB r g1stered )0 nillion ahor>s 1n 
New ~ork . Also, depositary issues aro bolng oonte~plated for 
salo in Europe. 
Nonetheless, United States subsidiaries in Japon have 
not boen overlY interested in stoe~ 3ales . Y.ost et then havo 
aucb a t~ • . s . =a~orlty that way 1ncrt~#o or stock 1n ~~?~••• 
han4a would throw ~~eric~ participation into tho minority . 
ln other cae s , tho Japanee$ n1nor1ty is elosoly hold, and 
neither party desires new atockholders .~6 
S. 7 Critienl Position of Forolfl!l F.xchense !!!!!! tho l"lalanee of 
i"a"Vr.."-nts 
::V•rr year since l9.S, m~rcl:.and.ise i=;>ort: bevo exceeded 
ex~orta, and out?ayconta tor ocean freight and other aer.1ces 
have been heevy. Slnce mid- l9SO, special dollar earnings 
have helped o~rset the ~erchand13e trade dof1clt, and beve 
~dded to the foreign oxobange reserves . Horotoforo, these 
46. Suainess Int~rnat1onal, op . cit. , 60. 
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receipts were accruod trom United Statos military expenditures ~ 
plus additional benof1ts f r om purchases by the Agoncy for 
International Development. Recently, military spending had 
droppod , Hhile rocoipts f'or experts dcatined to Wlderdeveloped 
countries receiving &~or1can assistance have increased. 
Concern with the Balance of Payments oituotion will 
probabl y always worry Japanese officials . At the end or 1961, 
the deficit on current account rogiotored $1, 085 million 
(compared to a surplus or $111 million in 1960). See Table 5-l. 
Reserve• rose to $2,035 million at tho end of April 1961 but , 
thereafter docl1nod to $1, 486 million by December. \Current 
r eserves stand at $1. 8 billion) . A variety or governmont 
pressures was applied to the economy during the second half 
of 1961, in order to curtai l the excessive growth and to control 
imports . By October 1962, the restrictions had succoedod, 
and subsequent relaxations were initiated . 
Nonetheless , tho Balance of Payments situation Hill con-
tinuo to be precarious . Since Japan has a $305 million standby 
credit with tho International ~!onetary Fund and export. have 
a seasonal surge in Spring, and toreign cnpi tal investment 
has grown, t ho nation is expected to weather current di fficulties . 
Moreover, exports are expected to rise in this decade, as now 
markets aro invaded. 
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~UL.l ~1 
Jar~'• 3elft~e~ o~ ~~~· 
(•. S. i K11:io~) 
~ 
CUrrant Trantaet1ona: 
1 o-.6 ~ !222 ~ 1.2::2 196o 
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f111ble trade 1,~ 2,402 2,914 2,1lli1 . ,280 ,,874 
(ICA) 128 101 111 147 
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(roroip~ 11. 
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''' 
}92 
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r.et roecoipta (or 
p0j'1Mnlo) 494 29} (}84) ~11 }}9 111 
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a!ieceipta 144 
Lon&-~er=:PaY%ente 142 
:S'et. receipt.. 
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Shor~·ter: Ll~ rtce!,t• 
or!p&Tolktl ) 
Total net receipt• 
or(p~::onto) 411 
OVEPAW. MET RE;tiPTS(PAYKEN'rS) - 522 
Snroe1 Onrttu i':ela!.10D.I Cor;oraUcm, Ja.;e, £xttCICIC !'TtiCI.tolS 
:APJ..."\, T'3£ !OOSCXf AT A Gt..L'tC! (!oko~, .;apM, 1~2), 2!. 
~ 
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},992 
74 
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"1 
,,861 
4,924 
9}7 
(1,085) 
}19 
156 
16, 
610 
7i} 
(}12) 
6 . 1 Rockpround 
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Chapter 6 
LEOAL AS:?gt'fS 
In soneral , any invoetment or technolosio•l lioenaing 
arrango111ont, ~thich c lla tor rel>lit,;ance or pro!'its or royalties 
in dollars or other fore1sn currencies , mu5t be ar~roved 
bot oro hand by the I'J.nistl')' ot !'insnce. At tho present ti.l:le , 
approval 1a usually gr~t~d only those 1nvost=ents which vill 
=ado a sisniti csnt contribut1on to tho ~odorniaation of in-
dustry and to the foreign oxch~c reserves . Once a project 
baa boon approved , howevor, tho re~ttance ot protito is 
virtually guaranteed. 
Technology controcta a.ro acroonod Just aa closely as 
equity invost:nents . On tho one hmd, the Minist%7 or F1nar.ce 
ado~ts a paternalistic attitude •ow"rd Japanoao business , and 
prevents foreign ti~s troa oftor~ng out- dated teohno.ogy, 
trom charging too much, or from setting excessive to~• · On 
tho other hand , tho government desires to provont too nuch 
in•ernal competition as a reault or foreisn technology 
introduction. :his inherent foor o!' foreign intervention 
often loads tho Japan••• to tho conclusion that it would bo 
in tho btst interes or tho nation for the govorn~~~ent to keep 
tirm control or international transactions . 
Provided !lil Aneric c.n buainesaman doeo not wAAt to tako 
his profits out or Japan or to liquidate hi3 oapital , ho mAy 
go into buainoss on tho aano basis as a Japan~• national. 
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Certain activities , such as the production of salt, tobacco, 
alcohol, and camphor, arc governoent monopol1es, and aro under 
strict government control and public ownership . Other activities 
are also quite restricted, such as public utilities and the 
exploitation of natural resources . The l'lAjOl' portion of tho 
railway aysten i s o~~ed and operated by the government , which 
is nlso n competitor in the electric power field . Quasi-
gove~ntal corporations competo with private enterprise in 
radio and television broadcasting, Telephone and telegraph 
communications have been publicly owned and operated since 
their first introduction into the country. 
Neverthel~ss , there are no signs that tho governnont 
intends to invade the private industrial sector by establish-
ing plants in com~otition with private enterprise, or to 
nBt1onal he elliat1ng fac1litiq3 nou undor private o\mership 
and ~anagenent . Safeguards are provided in the Constitution, 
the For e i gn Inv~str.lent La>~ , and tha Treaty of Friendship, 
Coonmerce , Md Navigation with the United States for coJnpensa-
tion in the event nationalization doe~ became necosoary. 
When one considers the history of industrialization in 
Japan and the present dearth of capital, it is not surprising 
thnt the Japanese government interforos so acti·;ely in private 
industrial affairs. In the immediate postwar period, assistance 
lar gely took the fOl~ Of loans and preferential allocations 
of foreign exchange . Recently, there has been o move to•nrd 
outright subsidies , ospocially i n those areas in direct coc-
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petiti on with foreigners , such as shipping. In spite of 
the present intervention, i t appears that private induatry 
in Japan -.;ill welcome a greater dogree of independence . The 
conservative leaders in government have proclaimed a de~ire 
for progress and industrial initiative, and the new generation 
or business executives entering the arena are not so desirous 
of government interference as their eldora . 
6 . 2 Ja'Onn 1 s Foroign Investrl.ent ,!:!!! ~ 13!.!:! .2f Foreign Exchango 
and Foreign Trade Control 
All foroign investments in Japan nro su'ojoct to the 
provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trado Control 
Law (P~FTC Law) which i s the general low for the entire field 
of foreign trananctions. As a special low, affiliated to this 
law, the Law concerning Foreign Investment was enacted in 1950 
for the purpose of guaranteeing the remittance abroad of 
profi t s and/or pri ncipal . It is mentioned at this point that 
the Japanese 1en (360 ~ • Cl , OO) is not freely convertible, 
and that the exchange of 1en for foreign curroncy is rigidl1 
controll ed by the govor~~ont . 
Even ~hen a foreign investor has obtained A license under 
th& FEFTC Law for a technological assistance contract, the 
acquis i t i on of securities , or the acquisition of claimable 
assets arioing from loans , he is usuall1 only allowed under 
the laN to receive yon compens~tion . Should he wish to rc~it 
the proceeds abr oad, ho must obtain a separate licenso each 
time he desires to so remit . This recurring difficult1 prompted 
the enact!tont of tho Foreign Inv~stment Law. tindar this 
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regulation, a foreign investor who oishod to remit abroad the 
eom?ensat1on for a technological assistance contract, or the 
princinal and dividends of stocks, proprietary interests , 
corporate debentures or beneficiary certificates - all of 
which have been validated under t ho law • is automatically 
guaranteed the right to remit . This is csllod the "system 
of guaranteeing romi t tenco abroad under the Foreign Inveat-
ment Law. n47 In addition, in the c ase when a foreign invostor 
acqUires stock, proprietary interests , beneficiary certificates 
or claims on loans due to trnnsfer , inheri tance or bequest 
from another roroignor who owned them with logal validation, 
the new owner moy with due designation under the law roaeive 
t he same guarantee for remittance abroad of tho principal and 
fruits . In all such casos of validation, the government i s 
obli ged to secure the necessary foreign currency by appro-
priating t he reserve in its foreign exchange budget . 
As a goncrAl rule , howovor , no validation under the law 
is reqUired for i nvestments so long as reMittance nbrond is 
not required . Any tcc~~ologioal nssistr~ce contract without 
cor.:pensation may be freely negotiated. liationals or certain 
designat ed countr ies (United States, onitod Kingdom, Franco , 
Gernany, ct. ol. ) mny freely acquire stocks of Japanese cor-
norations that are ~ot in certain restr icted 1nductr1es (pu~lie 
utilities , shipbuilding, banking, • t c . ) , if thoy are eontont 
to r eceive the principal and dividends in yen currency, to be 
47- The San><a Bnnl<, GUIDE TO I!lVESTl!EliTS Ill ;;~;J: , ( 1961) , 
2$- 26. 
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accumulated in Jap~~. Should one of these nationals acquire 
newly- issued stock of a corporation in the restri cted industries 
without the remittance guarantee , he is not required to validate 
the tranaaction under the law. Although a report of subscrip-
tion is required. The acqUisition of already- issued stock, 
however , is subject to validation under the law, rogardlesa 
of whether or not the guarantee for fUture remittance abroad 
of principal and dividends is desired . 1he situation for 
nationals of nondesignated countries i s olightly different, 
but •~ll not be included here . Tho acquisition of corporate 
debentures and beneficiary certificates , even when remittance 
in foreign currency is not required , and the conclusion of 
technological ass i stnnee contracts , whoso C¢:'!2pensation 1!1 to 
be paid in yen , are all oubject to licensing und"r the Fr;FTC 
Law. 
In general , foreign nationals may engage in busineas 
activities or buy propertiea as freely as Japanese nationals, 
and are subject , as are the Japanese, only to licensing required 
by law to engage in specific activitios . For the remittance 
abro&d of profits or oroceeds , howavor , the 1ndividunl must 
obtai n a permit each tine under the ~~C Law. Unfortunately , 
at present such remittance is not being permitted. 
\fuenover the government or other public bodies c0n!puloor1ly 
expropriate or condemn a uhole or pnrt of a foreign cap1 tal 
1nvestmont , the remittance abroad of the proceeds of such 
capital is guaranteed undor the Foreign Invos~~o~t Law. 
liovertbeless, it is aor:ewhat dit'ficult for an investor 
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to obt ain n validation under the Foreign Invost,.,nt La1<1 aa 
the governmont sets rather stringent requ1reaent5, and an 
inves~ent licensed under the PEFTC Law requires se~arate 
additional licenses for e•ch remittance . Consequent ly, a 
potential investor might be discouraged fron venturing into 
such a "closed invost:ter.t . " Therefore, two new f<rrmlas 
were established in July 19$9 to supplement the t"o fermer 
arrangements : (l) the conditional validation under tho Foreign 
I nvestment Law; nnd (2) license under the FgFTc Law (the 
approval formuln) . Under the former, the only differenoe from 
the original validation is that there is a SUP?lementnry con-
dition that "tho rern.itt1nce nay be suspendod temporarily 
whenever it is deemed that there is a serious difficulty in 
Japan's ~oreign exchange situation. •48 The a,proval formula 
is 3Ub3tnnt1ally the same na tho conditional validation with 
respect to remittanoe , oxce?t th~t a liccnoe is still required 
for each remittance . Ostensibly, the licensing is autanat1c 
if recognition has boon gr anted and foreign exchange reserves 
will a llow. One major advant age to t his rule is that , ><hereo.s 
the conditional validation i3 3Ubject t o the fulfillment of 
certain conditions, approval licensing is given in compliance 
with general circ=tunces; and 1t is , thus , more flexible . 
"o"hether the investor l.s negotiating a technological assistance 
contract or acquiring stocks, propriet~ry into ests , beneficiary 
certificates or COr?Orate debonturea , tha choice between tho 
48 . Tho Foreign Capita l Reso arch Society, FO:lE!Gll 
IN JAPAll 1962 (Bank of Japan , 1962) , !j. . 
IlPI',;5'!'MZ!!T 
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two rormulal is up to the applic~t . or ccurse, application 
~or tho unconditionol guar&,tee is at1ll por.n1ssible if !he 
1nvest=ent 1a conaido:-ed by tho gover:1010nt to =ko a sound 
contribution to th~ eca.3aoy. 
Al'lother step toward enc >Urac;ing the entry or foreign 
capitol hna boon tha treeing ot non- resident do~os1t acco~,ts , 
whi ch contain suoh iterns as the salea proceed~ o1' stocks, 
1nteroat, otc., tor transferabilit1 botwo n exchange non-rosi -
donta . AI of Hoy 1961, this se~-convtrt~bol1t1 wont ~n•o 
effect. This move will enable non- roaLdenta to liquidate 
their "t1o4" funds by aellir~ to other non- reoidenta . In 
effect, it nakes ~hls ~ccount almost aa !reel1 ecnvert1bl8 
as tho ncn-roa1den~ ~ret -yen account. Thia leaves only he 
non- reaidont "otrAr' de~osit account ~ tho rorei&n 1r.v stor' s 
depoa~t account as gener•lly inconvertible fund~ .49 
6. ) Invootm~nt Categori· s 
Whonevor a foreign national deairea to mako a cspital 
1nvoatment under t ho Forei gn I nvestment Low or und ·r the FEFTC 
L4w, h• nuot aubn't an a'pl1catlon to th• involved ~1n1stero 
through tho Snnk of Japan . Por tec~~olog1c 1 aa•1stance con-
tr cts, otocka involv'.ng mnnQ6e•ent part1oi?at1on, cloinable 
aoaets eris1na fro: lo~s , bonet!eiery cort1t1catos and cor?or-
ate debentures , the ~ls~e~ or ?inance and th4 ~~nister, 
having jurisdiction ove~ tho industry ccncernod, are 1~volved. 
49. 1'he 3anwa ani<, !C:GUI.Al'IC!IS COliC''RliiiiO l;l:!f- R4SII>;;lT m: 
ACCO\I!;T A~ID I'ORe!Gll IliVESTl!CliTS lh JAPANESE S:!CURil'I::S 
(Japan, 1961 ) , 2-7. 
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For stock5 ncquired on the market , and for bonof1ci ary certi -
ficates and corporate debentures for pu~lic subscription, only 
the Mini ster or Finance is contacted. 
Tho raspGetive Hinisters mo.ke decisions for ap:;>roval or 
dhapprovnl, !>ut l!IUs t consult with the Fore i gn Investment 
Council betor~ final judge=ent . There are c~rtain gonorel 
criteria ~nieh determine the dosirability of n particular 
investm•nt , as follows: (1) Tho foreign invos~ent must con-
tribute to the 1mprovonont of Japan ' • BOP; (2) the investment 
must contribute to the de velopment of essential induotrics or 
public enter prises; (J) the investMent nust not have nn adverse 
effect on the Japanese economy; and (4) in the case of license 
arrangements , tho terms should be for a limited duration and 
should be fair. 
The main form of invootmont , and that most encouraged 
by the Japanese govor~~ent, 1s the tochnologicn: aos!stanco 
eontro.ct (license , kno'lt-how, and tech.•1ieo.l assistance) . Those 
contracts >lbich ar e longer than a :roar and/or require roynlt!es 
pa:ymont over a year ' s term and which require payrr~nt i n foreign 
currency, are cla:a3 A contrr:cts and require valldntion unde 
the Foreign Investment Law. All others are elaso B contracts, 
and "'ust be Ucenood under the F?re Law {although no license 
is requi red whon compensation is involved) . Tno applicant also 
has the option ot applying for recognition undor the approval 
formula in the event he wishes to remit abroad. 
The gove~~nt ma~ntains fairly stri~ent requirements 
concerni ng technological assistance arrangement n, among which 
aro : 
(1 ) Usually , 5 years is the maximun term allowed (espe-
cially with know-how) ; and preferred royalty ratos are 
ar e 2 t o 5 %. Although exceptional cases have been 
approved for longer per iods at up to 7%. 
(2) I t i s essential that t he licensor have patents 
registered i n Japan; and l iccnnoa of technology , already 
i ntroduced into Japan, nro di scouraged. Also, ~he 
licensed t echnology nust be clearly defined. 
(3) MinL~ royalties and grant- back clauses are dis-
liked . 
(4 ) Clauses requiring the licensee to cease manufacture 
upon the termination of the l icense agroemont are u~ually 
doloted , except for valid patonts. 
( 5) !-!er G t r ademar k lioonso arrongononts aro not approved ; 
and t hose agreements with n wholl y- owned or majority-
cont r ol1ed subsidi ary of the licensor are disapproved. 50 
For the guida,nee of Japanese c or.:rpanio s and foreign inves-
t ors , the gover nment per iodicall y publishes a list of preferr ed 
technol ogy. 
In the casa of stocks , no logal proceduro is required 
unl ess t he industr y is in t ho restricted category or remittance 
abroad of the dividends and/or principal is required . In such 
so. aornan Jensen , "Legal Aspects of' Doing BU31ness in Japan , II (Japan Society of Booton Business Se~inar, February 28 , 
1962 ), 2- 3 · 
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cases, tho rules of the Foreign Investment and FEFTC Laws 
(~<hich are discussed in the previous section) apply. ;.non 
a juridi cal person is purchasing $tOck, the gove~~ent suggo3ts 
an sccO':llpanying delivery of technology to enh<Ulce approval. 
In addition , approval or an inves tment, representing more than 
$0% of the total stock of a c~pany , is not granted . At 
pr esent , ~~ything over 1$% is difficult to nogotiate . 
However , approval is not required where designated f~ eign 
nationals invest in a ne»ly organized Japanese company which 
is not in t ho restricted industries , and when they are wi lling 
to forego the guarantees of the Forei gn Invost.,.,ent Lew . Thus , 
a United St ates concern may legslly organize a wholly- owned 
or a .ajor1ty- controlled subsidiary in Japan. Also , branch 
investments are allowed; but they are not oligible for a~prova l. 
The pt~edure for beneficiary certific•tes (of loan 
trusts and security 1nvestmont trusts), corporate debentures, 
and claimable assets arising from loans is similar to that 
for technology contracts. 
6.4 Busi ness Organization 
The Commercial Code of Japan provides for several types 
of busi noss organization: the single entrepreneur, the part-
nership, and tho stock co~oration or joint- stook co~oration .Sl 
The first is, as 1n other countries, a person \mo on his own 
behaLf ongages in c~ercia~ activities . 
me partnorsh1p c~tegory mny be subdivided into two forms : 
$1. W'l'IS , Part 1, !lo. $9- 2, 6 . 
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unlimited (ganei- kaisha) and liMited (goshi- kaisha) . The 
unlimited partnership is quite similar to its American counter-
part . Tho liMited partnership is ~ch the same as in certain 
European countries, wherein a portion ot the rnenbers possess 
only limited liability. 
The joint-stock corpor~tion (kabusbik1- kaisha) corresponds 
most nearly in ro~ to t he American corporation, and is usually 
the ono MOSt agreeable to Amoricnn investors . There muat be 
at leaat 7 promoters, 3 directors, and 1 auditor, and at least 
one- quarter of the authorized stock must be suscribed to at 
the time of organization. 
Branches of foreign corpor ations are subj•ct to the same 
provio ions of the Code ae Japanooo companies . Any foreign 
concern which intends to continuo doing business in Japan 
must establish a branch office and duly register with the 
authorities. However , it is pointed out that such ventures 
are not granted approval un~or tho 1nves tmont lasw and , so , 
r emittance or profits is noo almost i mpossible . 
6 . 5 Remittance~ RenatriAtion of Capita l 
Aa of August l , 1962, the ~11nistry or Finance reduced 
the waiting period for withdrawal of non-resident r~~ds from 
2 years to 6 months . 52 This appli es to the proceeds from the 
aale of stocks, corporate debentures , bonoficiar; certificates , 
and cle1mQble assets arising tram loano - all originally 
purchased with foreign exchange . As this now ruling apulios 
52. I nternational Commerce , October 8 , 1962, 54. 
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only to approved i nvestments, fUnds in tho non- transferable 
non- resident de-oosit account and tho foreign i nvestors acc w nt 
are still blocked . 
If tho investment is liquidated before the end of the 
6-~onth period , the yen proceeds may be used to oither purchase 
additional Japanese securi ties (renewing the 6-month \lait) 
or to bo dePosited i n tho transforable non- resident deposit 
account . However , once in this account th~ yen cannot bo 
converted directly into foreign exchange, evan after the 6-
month waiting poriod . The onl y rocourso would be to sell the 
account to anothor non- reaid&nt . 
As for tho ro~ittanco of dividends and royalties of 
approved or v311dated (full or conditional) investments, full 
end immediate conver tibility into foreign exchange has boen 
poaa1~le for some ti&o , 
6 .6 Current Tronds 
The above sections present a general picture of the le~al 
o1t uat1on concerning tho entry and remittance of foreign 
capita l . Naturally , there are more specific legal ramifications 
which govern each and every foreign transaction . Po~ instance , 
e ven though an i nvestment Hhich settles £or yen proceeds is 
not no~ required to obtain approval, thoro is sace expe c ta-
tion that the govorm:ent may i n the future requiro licensing 
or such oporationo . Mother ar~a or concern is with t he 
renewalof technical assis~ nco contracts . Unless the licensor 
has a valid patont in Japan, his ohanoes or obt~ining a favor-
able renewal contrac t are slim. 
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It is quite probable that the present laws concerning 
investr~nt and foreign oxehangc will unde rgo drastic ch&nges 
in the near future . Considering Japan ' s growing role in world 
trade , it will b~eome increasingly difficult for her to :ustify 
foreign exchange contr ols . Already, extensive liberalization 
of inr>orts has been eff ec ted . By the 34.'!10 token, tho demands 
ot 1nduatr1al growth for nore capital will undouotedly force 
the Japanese to seek assistance from abroad . 
In general , the Japanese qovernmont has no objections 
to tho entry of for oign eanital . Still, their proferoneo t~ 
technology and loans illustrates the fact that the Japanese 
want capital on their o>rn terms . AS long as they control tho 
1nvostntents , they have no fear of' foreign 11 takaovers . '' Yet, 
if ono considers the all-pervading and informal influence 
which the sovernrnent oxerc1aes over business, and tho present 
favaorabl e stntus of Japan •s foreign exchange reserves, it 
is possible to foroe~ a gradual easing of ;resent restrictions . 
Thus far, the Japanoso government appears to be pro-
gressing very favorably along thia line . It has prom~sed to 
eliminate by April 1, 1963 the last restrictions on the length 
of tL~e foreigners ~ust hold Japanese aocuritios before con-
verting tho proceeds into th~ir o~ currencies . This period 
had once been over six years; l~at summe r it wan cut fro~ two 
years to six month . With all time restrictions to be ro~oved 
soon, the Japaneso are expecting a sharp rise in •ecur1ties 
investnents by foreigners , especiall y ~~erican. 
Concurrently, some restrict ions on joint venturea involving 
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fore1en can,anies will oe lifted . Al so, fcreign f1l.n com-
panies ><ill be allo11ed to send some earnings out of tho country .53 
(Heretofore , such earnings had been c ampl•tely blocked) . Host 
pro~ising of all , however , is tho report trom reliable sources 
that full eonvort1bility of tho Japanoso yen 1o eX?ectod to bo 
achieved by leto 1964. a1tb this event , many of the present 
problems encountered by foreign investors 1<ill be d1m1nated . 
$) . BUSINESS ·,IB>K, Karch 30, 1963, 70. 
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Chapter 7 
LABOR OliiO!IS AliD I!IDlJS~RIAL Rl:LATIO!iS 
7.1 Position of the Unions 
Prior to World War II, tho numbet of' unions and uorkers 
member percen tage were insignificant. However, the Occupa-
tion authorities instructed tho Ja~anoso government to encourage 
t he uni onizat ion of l abor as a otep toward democratization. 
Thereafter , growth of the unions has boen ra~id . By 1958, 
t here wore an es timated 37, 823 labor unions with total ~enber­
shiu of 6,881, $81, or about 35 . 1~ of the industrial employee> . 
Union• with 500 members or more account for only 7,, of the 
aggregate . As this would suggest , about 90% of all unions 
are organized on a plant basis . ~~reas , only 3% represent 
industrial unions ; $.1%, craft unions ; ~~d 0. 6%, regional 
unions . Although many are looaely oGaoci atod in a federa-
t ion, i t is oo.sy to see >~hy organized labor has relatively 
little power in the econ~~c s ohore . 
On the other hand , t ho t hree central labor organizations 
wie ld no insignificant ~~ount of political influence. In the 
socialist • ector, SOHYO, wi th 46 ~~ions of 3, $48, 921 ~ombors 
i n 19$8, constituted 51~ of total organized labor . ~1• fed-
er ation, originally organized in 1950 as an ant1 -c~un1st 
labor movement, has drifted slowly t o tho left under tho 
leadership of Kaoru Ota - a man who hates occidontals and has 
pledged to abandon democratic pr inciples . It is generally 
believed that this r adicalism of SOHYO is chiefly tho product 
of a few too l eade rs, inasmuch as two- thirds of the ~ribership 
i s eo~posed of conservative government worLers . Nonetheless , 
' . 
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there is a close connection ~~tb the Japanese Socialist ?arty, 
which many observers claim is actually dominated by SOHYO. 
Currently, there is an increasing number of ?rotests 
by so~e unions against this leftist attitude , ZIDIRO , which 
subscribes to the principles of codern trado unionism w1 til o 
omnhasis on economic rather than political objectives, hao 
beco~e a ~ajor influence with a membership of 796,4$$ as of 
19$6. The third most i:nportant group is the SHIJi SAliB~SU 
which is even m<>ro conservative than ZEJIRO, but had only 41, 214 
members in 19$6. 
Recently , there has been ineroasing nressuro plaoed on 
orgsni;ed labor and its considerable political activities by 
both the gover~~ent and the two ma<or industrial organizations, 
the Japan .:;>n;>loyer ' s Association and the Japsn rtanagement 
Association . H~~cver , such moves will sur&lJ be cireuro~cribed 
by tne influence of the I nternati<>nal Confederation <>f Free 
Trad~ UOions L~d the International Labor Organi7.ation. 
In spito c>f such political activities , the influence 
of the unions does not appear to be an important factor at 
the worker level . This uncertain and l~tod role dorives 
from t he history and leadership of the union movon:ont , and tho 
c. lose relationship between t,•orkors and com-pnny, which at pre-
sent allows little scope for an active local tmion aport from 
wage negotiations . (Incidentally, wage and allowance disputes 
account for approximately 70~ or oll labor disputes) . In 
considering the future potential or the unions, one must bear 
in mind the fact that the present promotion system in industry 
••• 
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may well nake avAila~le to ~~· unions tho neceaaory leadersh~p 
!ron the rtnks of aobitioua, but disa~oointed roung con. 
1.2 Characteristics 2£ Fm lozm•nt 
Although the Japenoee facto~ appo•rs similar to its 
AIOoricnn counterpart, thoro are imnortant variations which 
derive fr~ the differences between the two social syote~s . 
These variations cover thl cr~t1cal ~as ot interpers~nal 
relations and group interaction, t!le nature or the relattcn-
ahip betwern the ~orker and the c~pRn7, and in the way in 
which ekills and energioa are mobilized and dirooted in tho 
group. 
A very critical distinction is brcught out by the life-
tiDe t nure ot the ~ployt~ with the orgeni•at!on, o1t~a­
t1on Which effectively th><arta the l'IO!:>ility Of both •killed 
and unsldll~d ~o:-kera . Japaneae manage:nent defenda th!.s setup 
by auertins thet the com·,onios are morally lD und to provide 
work for the large labor force . This explains the reason for 
tho existence of n largo nUMber or part-time workora. 
Such a binding comoib4ent is closely oupported by the 
system or recruit~~nt, wOlch is b•sed on th~ educational level 
ot tbe candidate, and the 17at•m or revarda and 1ncent1Y~ s, 
wblch ore baaed • ricarily on •en1orit0 . Basically, full -time 
cm,loyees m•y be divided into two catagcrios: (1) tho r .ctory '• 
wap,e workers (ko1n) who are recruited from the lowor lov,ls or 
tb• educational oystom and from the farm areaa; and (2) the 
salaried em~loyeos (shol~n) who ore !reo the high school levels 
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an~ are distinguished from the college graduates occu~ying 
executive >o•itions an~ eligible for the topmost rank .S4 
Moreover, the promotiona. oyatem doos not rovide for trsns-
tor between these two groups , thus setting a high value on a 
college education. Buidea these pel'lll!lllent >0 rkars, th•re 
are also a large n~~er ot part-time ~ployees; out there are 
no binding tics between the" and the fim . Bo>~evor, th''7 are 
eligible for promotion to tho ko1n level, or they aay qu~t 1n 
order to work elsewhere . 
In view or the fact that a p&t$rnallst1c attitude glides 
the employer ' s relation to the workers , wages and sa~aries are 
not doomed essential aa a production incentive . Rather, tho 
basic doterminant ot a man 1s salary or wage leve.1 (>~o.,en are 
paid leas on the avorAgo) ia his seniority within the organi-
•ation. Inas:::uch u a good ;> rcentaao or an e:- lo,eo • a ·a7 is 
in the form of fringe benefits , his otf'icial ooition within 
the tinn and his seniority (which regulates hio promotions) 
art highly i m?or tant tactoro . 
According to the statistics ~ the International Labor 
Organization, Japanese cub wages averaged 26(. an hour in 1957, 
canpared to 2 . 01 in tbe onited States and '31 in Italy . S5 
However, it is a fact that base pay accounts tor only about 30 
per cent of tl:e total re o~un ration . Low-coat haua1D,4 , free 
medical ~erviees, neala at low pricos , company VAcation resorta , 
54. Janoa G. Abegglen , op. oit ., 29. 
• • 
;5, U.S •• Japan Trade Couneil, PAC?S ABOUT JAPANESE WAG!S (Waob-
ington, D. C. , 1961) . 
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bonuses and pension funds , and expense ~ccounta and autos (for 
executives) ~re only~ part or tho extras . (See rable 7-1) . 
Added to this , is the fact that cash wages are presently rising 
as a result of shortages of skilled labor and tho demands of 
tho unions . However, it should be mentioned that the Japanese 
enjoy a much higher purchasing power than straight wage com-
parisons with other countries would indicate. 
7 . 3 Postures of Jaoanose Manage~cnt 
Japanese businessmen are ~ucb more conservative than 
Americans in their approach to nonagement problems, and hove 
been somewhat reluctant to adopt scientific management pri n-
ciples. One of the r easons for this is the fear of disrupting 
tho 11stntus quo , " which appear s to be sufficient in tho minds 
of the conservatives for present needs . Toe patornaliotic 
attitude of management , which sees the spreading of >o rk to 
a l l emnloyees as a moral obligation, is one of the main hi nd-
rances to mechanization . Moreover , in the majority of f irms 
thoro is a tendency to vie>~ the market as static and , thus , 
to resist innovations like inventory and quality control and 
market roseorch . 
Tb.e influence ot tho govel"'l'U'1&nt, moreover, 1s f·•lt very 
keenly by businessmen. The general objective ot tho govern-
ment has been to strengthen Japanese co:op~titiveness in wo1•ld 
markets by avoiding internal coropetition with its accompanying 
excess onpneity and expenditures . 
Another peculiar aspect of manag~~ent is tho absence ot a 
locus or responsibility in the decision-making process . Rather 
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Table 7- 1 
MON'I'HLY WAGES AND TYPe OF PAYMeNT • 
(36U, • ~I.tJO) 
Shokuin kion 
-Alllount Amount 
Typo of Payaent {Yen) Per Cent (Yen) Per Cent 
Base Pay 6,390 27 , 5 4,751 26 . 7 
Work Allowance 7,67J 33. 1 4 , 604 25 . 8 
Temporary Allowance 5,741 24 . 8 
PYoduetivity Al lowance 5, 028 28 . 2 
Ago Allowance 1,835 7, 9 1 , 982 11.1 
Paaily Allowance 956 4 .I 1, 367 7 . 7 
Attendance Allowance 678 2. 9 693 3, 9 
Wiscellancous 367 2,1 
Deductions - 69 -0. 3 
- 980 - S. S 
Sub- tolil ZJ, Z04 100. 0 17,812 100, 0 
Overtige 3,498 
26,702 
I S. ! 4,847 
22 , 659 
27 . 2 
Source: James G, Abcgglen, THE JAPANUSE FACTORY . , . , 52 , 
• The fira is a aetals -processlng plant ~ eoploying some 3,400 
persons , located in the Osah-Kobe area . 
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than engago in a st~ulating debate , the Japanese tend to seek 
the harmony of agreeroent . Principal parties are U3ually sought 
out beforehand for their views so that the meetings can proceed 
smoothly to the desired objective. This quite often is very 
perplexing to the ~~erioan executive when negotiat1~~ ~ith n 
Japanese management group . Unless the AMerican obtains a ro-
cord in writing during the "eeting, he very often discovers 
that subsequent proceeding• may alter tho original agreement . 
Unlooa he realizes that this is a t ypical way for the Japanese 
to conduct their negotiations , he will probably mistakenly 
equate such ambiguity with evasive docoit . Hence, the torm: 
''those inserutable orientals . " 
Nonetheless, thore are certain factors which are threat-
ening to altar the traditional syotom: (1) the consumer market 
boo= has attracted the attention Qf bus1ne~e execut1voa to the 
demands of the public; (2) a now gonoration of buo1nessmen, 
with new concopts ot management, is gradually emerging; and 
(3) the sheor complexity of Cl)mpetitivc pressurco from abroad 
and from technological change is forcing s reorganization of 
management and the introduction or a new system of decision-
making . 
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PART III 
EX'rEH OF FORBIGII IIIVESTH',ITS 
Chapter 8 
PRg5E!IT FOREIGN INVBST!-!l:NTS 
8 . 1 Technological Assistance Contracts 
This chapter t<ill expand ~lightly the treatment of section 
4. 2 . In addition , selected tabloo are included at the end of 
eoch section. It must be admitted , however , that a com~l~te 
picture of the entire foreign investnent situation is L~poss1ble 
duo to the largo number of indi vidual t1eups and tho growing 
developments in current negotiations. Therefore , discussion 
will be generally limited to the si tuation as it existed up 
to the September 1962, and wi ll treat only those eases which 
have received valid~t1on or aPProval Ynder tho investment laws . 
Such eases as Ampex Corp, and Singer Co. (which have not re -
ceived validation) '"'" note>~orthy , but are still the exception. 
Por a more detailed cov~rage of i nvestment t~ansactions, the 
latest i ssues of tho STATISTI CAL DATA and LIST PRINCIPAL CASES 
OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN1/ESTMEIIT i n JAPAN by the Foreign Capital 
Research Society and the SURVEY of JAPANc'SE FINA!ICE & INDUSTRY 
by the Industrial Bank of Japan aro recomcended . 
As of September 1962, there wore 1, 836 technological 
assi stance contracts concluded , an incrGase of 125 cases since 
December 1961. The annual peak was recorded in 1961 with 320 
eases , followed by 1960 with 227; while the ebb yoara were 19$4, 
19SS, and 19$8 With less t han 100 cases in each year . (See 
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Table 8-1) . Tbia trond indicates that :he introduction of 
technologJ is tied closely to ee~~~1e conditions and the 
lnvestmont activ1 ty of Japaneae eom:.anies . In vloW of the 
recently lnpsed cl~p down on the economy by the government 
during l9bl- b2, it is interesting to note thet 125 tieupo 
were po~itted during tho first 8 months of 1962. 
or these eontracta, the electrical machinery industry 
accounted tor about 2J~. other machinery 2k~, and the chem!cal 
tnduatry 21. (See Table 6-2) . fr1nc1pal investing countries 
Aero the United Statoa with b)~, Gen:any with 9,, Swit•erland 
with 7~, and Br i t ain with 2~. 
In the electric machinery sector, electronics accounted 
ror about b5% of tho total . Ancng the American invastors 
were Radio Co~oration or ASerica , International General 
Electric , oester~ Electric, and International Standard Eleetric .56 
Tbe introduction or technology in this industry, other than 
those of electronics and electric wire and cable, amounted to 
about 27~ of t ho total . In the transportation machinery 
sector , the automobile, shipbuilding, and aircraft industries 
accounted for bulk. Mechine toola , textile, chemical pre-
cea~1ng, and bus1neaa ~aebin~a eompro~sed a :ejor ~crtion 
in the industrial maehi 1ery area . Various contracts aro still 
being n•gotleted between 4~~r1c•n and Japanese steel conpanles , 
and aluninum manufacturing techni ques are much in do~nd . 
In the oi l r efining industry , technology contracto have 
$6 . Pore1gn Capital Roaearoh Soe1•ty, STATISTICAL OATA 
ANO LIST ••• (Japan, ~~reh Jl , 1960), J - 1?, 
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almost invariably been accompanied by equity investments. For 
a list of the major oil co~paniea, see table on page 111· Other 
fields ~b1cb have seen significant introduction of technology 
are the petrochemical, the chemical tertilizer , ?harmaeeuti-
cal, chemical fibre , and the automobile tire industries . In 
the i ndus t ries, also, a number of joint venture• have resulted 
from technology negotiationa. Table 8-7 lists the principal 
joint investment chemical firms . 
In order to encourage and facilitate technology intro-
duction , the ~~nistry of Finance and the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry jointly publish periodically a 
list or desired technology . 
8 . 2 Loans ~ Japanese Compani es 
The total outstanding value of the claimable asset s arising 
from loans by foreign i .nvestors was about $1 .2 billion. (See 
Table 8-3) The percentage, booever, of these loans in the 
annual tota l of all industrial equipment invoa~~ents in Japan 
amounted to only 1 to 2% before 19$4, and only about 3 to 4~ 
since. Therefore , although such loans represent the most 
sizeable foreign investment , t heir role should not be over-
emphasized. However, the contribution was significant to the 
reconstruction of the Japanose economy, inasmueh as these tunds 
were predo=inantly invested in koy industries, including tho 
electric , iron and steel, petroleun, and shipbuilding. (See 
Table 8-4) This concentr ation of aid brings the percentage 
or foreign investment in those industries to a s ignificant 
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Table 8- 1 
Validated (or Recognized) Technical Agree.aonts 
for the Introduction of Foreign Teehnology into Japan 
Fiscal Unitet.l 
Years rou l States 
(Nuaber o£ Cases) 
1949 
1950 27 21 
1951 101 74 
1952 133 88 
1953 I 03 72 
1954 82 58 
1955 72 44 
1956 144 85 
1957 118 61 
1958 90 63 
1959 153 92 
1960 227 200 
1961 320 187 
'I'OTAL I, 670 l .04S 
1962 April -September 166 116 
Source: Dopsrt8ent of State Airgra. froa the Aaerican Eabassy 
in Tokyo, July 2S, 1962 . 
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Table 6-2 
Technotoaicat AssistaAc~ Contract (As of bic~bor 31 , l9bl) 
Classif1c1tion by th• kind of Jndust~ of Foreign Investor 
.~ r o 
Kind of lnJustry Cues Ratio 
Electrical Machinery Industry 371 23\ 
Generators, Tra.Mfon~er & Indu.stnal Henry lJ 
Electric Wire Cable 2~ 
to..unication ~chintry 214 
Othor Electrieal 'lachinery 100 
1 ransportat ion !teac.hinery Jnf.lustry 107 7 
Other r.tachincry Industry l~SJ 24 
Priae Movers SO 
Machine Tools lb 
Textile ~tachlnery l9 
Other Machinery J04 
t.foul 4 "fetal Products Industry lS~ 9 
Clloalcal Industry .140 ll 
Synthetic fibres 11 
Orugs 4 Acricultural Medicines 10 
Oraanic 6 \on· Orl&nlC Ch•Icah 20-t 
Otber ,h .. ical Industry l& 
Pttroleua Industry 44 l 
Rubber & Leather lnctustry 4~ 3 
ConstnJ.ction Works Industry 16 1 
Glass 4 Stone Industry 21 2 
Spinning fi h'caving I ndust.ry 81 S 
Paper a l'ulp Industry HI J 
Electric. Power ~ Gu Suprly Industry 3 
Recreation & Amuseaent rnJustry 2 
P<intlng I P\lbllshlnJ Industry S 
Foodstuffs lndu.stry S 
TOTAL 1,6U 100 
Source: Foreign Capital Research Society, POREI~~ INV~TML\1r IN 
JAPA~ 1962 (¥ank of Japan, Tokyo , April 1~62), 14 . 
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figure . 
Tho major creditor bas beon tho World Bank with 42%, 
followed by the Export- Import Bank of Washington with 21%. 
Ot her loans were extended by United St ates commercial banks, 
parent enterprises , manufacturers and other private sources ~ 57 
Total loans during 1961 C8l!le to $365 million, of which 
the World Bank and the Ex-lm Bank accounted for ~224 million . 
Foreign credits on a private-to-private basi• anounted to 
$161 million, r esulting mainly from increased credits given 
to domestic oil companies by their connected foreign companies 
and by United State• commercia l banks for plant and equipment 
expansion. Credity from European countries totaled $13 .8 
million but the majority of ~rivate loans are still fro~ 
American sources . 
8. 3 Stock Acquisition 
Foreign investment in Japanese stocks has been increasing: 
$27 ~llion in 1959, $74 million in 1960, end $116 million in 
1961. (See Table 8 -5) Of the $116 million in 1961, $60 million 
($6 million over 1960) were from investors desiring manogement 
participation and $56 mi llion (a $35 million jump over 1960) 
were f rom open market sales. The jump in open market sales 
i s due primarily t o the efforts of securities companies and the 
g rowing attrac tion of Japan's swi t fly growing industries. 
The total amount ot stocks acquired f rom management par-
ticipation was $127 million at the end of 1961. This involves 
The Sanwn Sank, GUIDE TO INVEST!-IEI'T lll JAPAN (Japan, 1961) , 
15. 
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Table 8- 3 
Lender 
• 1 at ons 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
Fisc:al : Export .. l•port: City: 
Year IBRD: Bank, Wash. Banks : Others : TOTAL 
1950 
& 
1951 0 4 , 026 4 , 026 
1952 0 10, 000 24,457 34, 457 
1953 40 , 200 7, 000 2 , 162 49, 362 
1954 0 4 , 000 11. 279 15, 279 
1955 13 , 400 20 , 477 13~ 177 47,0S4 
1956 24,300 25 ,927 3 , 000 40 ,425 93 , 652 
1957 15, 000 so ,oso 6, 600 22, 329 123, 979 
1958 166 , 000 28, 230 31,510 5, 733 231,473 
1959 84 , 000 20, 186 7, 200 16, 229 127 , 61 5 
1960 25 , 000 21,300 38, 814 42,018 127, 132 
1961 120, 000 98, 335 84 , 7S2 84 , 538 387 , 605 
TOTAL 4S7 ,900 274, 028 213 , 333 266, 373 1 , 241 , 634 
Source: Dopartaent of State Alr&rae froa the American Eabassy 
tn Tokyo , July 25 , 1962 , J . 
-93-
Table 8- 4 
~quisition of Claiaable Assets Arls1nR froa Loans 
{As of Deceaber 31~ 1§61) 
Classification b5 the Kind of Industry 
(thousan s of 
Kind of lndustrr 
~lachinory 
\fctals 
Cheaicals 
Spinning & Weaving 
Potroleum 
Mining 
Construction 1\'orks 
Paper & Pulp 
dollars) 
No . of 
Cases 
18 
23 
27 
4 
29 
4 
8 
1 
Electric Power 4 <:a.s Supply 33 
Transportation ' Co.aunication 36 
Warehousing & Storage 
Foreign 1'riadO S Wholesale 
Foods tuffs 
Financing and Insurance 
Glus & Stono 
TOTAL 
2 
6 
2 
12 
208 
Aaount of 
Loan 
79,139 
26>,259 
43, 136 
1,431 
178,207 
20,447 
110 , 700 
100 
286,27S 
221,396 
17~ 
1,1>0 
280 
7,500 
2,400 
1,217,594 
Ratio 
6\ 
22 
4 
IS 
2 
9 
18 
I 
100 
Source: Foreign Capital Research Society, FOREI~~ ~~~TMf.NT 
i N JAP~~ 1962 (Bank of Japan, 1962), 16. 
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only those companies that have received validation under the 
Foreign Investment Law. The number or cases amounts to 298. 
Although there are a number of cases which are not validated, 
the total amount involved is small by comparison. 
The majority of the approved cases consists of joint 
ventures, wherein both parties organizo a new co~pany . Of 
course , it is possible for a foreign firm to obtain stock in 
an already existing Japanese corJOration for management pur~ 
poses; but, the government rarely per.mlts ownership of over 
5~ to one investor . The minim~~ Minority interest acceptable 
to American investors is usually 35~. 
Therefore, the majority of negotiations involve joint 
ventures, end are generally associated with a technological 
assistance arrangemantJ plus cash . The government is, as a 
rule , reluctant to allow cash investment solely and uses this 
pressure as a lever to obtain desired technology . Yua largest 
percentages of foreign holdings are in \he oil refining, ~etro­
eheroical, pharmaceutical, agricultural chemicals, foreign 
trade and wholesale industri es . (See Table 8-6) It is note-
worthy th~t all, save the last two, have also absorbed signi-
ficant t echnology investments . 
8.4 Other Investments 
In addition to the above , an investor may also purchase 
beneficiary certificates (loan trusts and securities invest-
cent trusts), corporate debentures, and bonds in foreign 
currency. Ho•ever, these forms of ~nvaa~ent are not very 
significant. As the returns are not any more appealing than 
I 
\.1\ 
~ 
I 
FlSCill 
Yeor 
1950 
1951 
1952 
195} 
I!>~ 
IP55 
1956 
19$7 
19!18 
15>59 
1960 
1961 
TOTAL 
: 
r,: 19 "-~ 
! "''VI",·n"!"t "" F~:<rAi""'' .. -r"' !n J"J?, ... ':,~ 'S•!:Ir.t<Ot tl'tr'l"tJf'~ '"'"" s• ... r."i (,\.,(!•lilt 
Jl'l 1"1t Vnntv,.~'j. ~l"d Sx,•u·r,l,,. ~"f St('\~ ~,,. .... ., .. A '"'1-,'-tt-; \,-guiror"' •t.,.n•nb P-ev! ou-; l ... y.e.'l~-nt 
Destd ...,,. f..,rt'"'' t~"'~'~·""":"" y.1 ! l~atl""~"" 
( '._T.ourt~ in tht·US"lnds of OO II ~rs ) 
--------
Through Stock Market : Joint V•nture:s 
: fln~lyd~~ (lght~J : TOT,\L 
• No .• of Ca"'SI' : ~vnt : No. of Ca;rs ; Amount : no, 2' Cou·~ : A'ftou.nt 
-
-
76 } ,1 50 76 ~, I SO 
~98 1,~0 204 J I, 766 50~ 13,326 
I ,003 2,106 962 8 , 017 1,965 10, 1 2~ 
977 1,20~ I , 638 3,797 2, 61' 5, 002 
1,539 1, 268 1,671 2, 702 3, 210 3,970 
2,208 I , 527 I, 125 },574 J, nJ 5 , 101 
3 , 18~ 3,155 3, 771 6 , 365 6 , 956 9 , 520 
~,231 ),2'97 3 , 841 8 , 193 6 , 872 II , 490 
},852 5, 1}3 4 , 222 6,217 8 , 074 11,350 
6, 923 9,550 7, 171 17,481 14, 094 27 , 031 
14 , 026 2 1,9'10 10 , 165 52,1 91 24 , 191 74, ~ ~· 
24, 450 55,849 9 , 401 60, 063 33,941 115,912 
61 ' 782 106,610 44 ,047 183,516 105,82'9 290, 126 
Soure•: Depar tment of Stote Alrqrbn from A~erican ~DS5y ln Tokyo , Ju ly 1962, 5. 
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Tlll!.& t-6 
Val!!at.ed .\ce•.t1•1 ~\eon or Stoei: s..•u! ~.::. lT\ ~u..ro· It~t"!'re~t. 
{With P&rt.icipaUon in V-an&L,~t.) 
(.U ot l)oce~r }1, 1961' 
Olaasiticat1on by the Kin4 o~ Industry 
(thoueonde of doll•r•) 
Un4 of' Industry 1io . ot Jlo . o~ 3Mros Allount Ratto 
~··· (I" thou.oande) Paid (~) 
£leot.r1cal Machinery ~~ eo,426 1;,670 11" 
Tranapor~t!oa ~.act!ntry 7 2,~ 871 ! 
Otber r.ae..~"''7 !i6 ,,,116 t, !17 ~ 
~·t•l• I' !i6,,2, 11,715 9 
Ohr.:ica:1 57 4,,,~ '2 ,426 26 
Spinn1nc ~ Woaving 9 ,.~ 8~ 
?1\rol..:. 26 1e1,924 45,S~ }6 
Ru~bor a. L11t.her 15 }4,2'' 9. ~(ll 8 
Oonatruct10D Vor~ 6 209 297 
Cla•• & Stone 10 7,167 ,,168 2 
L~•:ber • W.lOd 2 24 
' ?apor & P..tlp 1 10 
Trantportation & 
Co ::aunt C6 t1 :>n I' ,,120 ,.,2 
Warthoualn& & S~ora e 1 40 
Foroitn Trade & Vhol•••l• 24 15,697 1, i,_ 2 
Stnicta ~ ll>C ~r-.: 
?oobk~l I 100 1,9 
TOTAL 298 
Sou.rcet ForoigD Capital Ruearch Society, P'O!U:JG.'I I'i'IIS'Z~lT 19 
JAPA.., 1962 (E..'1l: or J•?""• 1962), 15. 
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T.UU: 8-7 
Prlnci~l Joint Jnyeet:~~ ~~ca.l eo-•f\1•• 
• • 
Year I Joint :!nYett~ t Ford"' I Jape::eae t Capital I roro1g> 
•• u 0' ~tnt Co . Co, Co. : (S:;l.ll.): Intenat. 
Purukt. va 
19,0 Jap&ntst 2.oon Goodrich lleotric,!Uppon 8 ~}% 
Cl>oma.1 Co . Li"'t !~et.&1, 
(US) Yoicohaaa Rubber 
1~1 Japan Peieh- Ro1cho14 Ot.1n1ppon 1 
hold Chta1cah 
(US) 
Pr1nt1ng 1~ 
1~1 r.1ttu~hh1 :Monea::to Kitoub1ahl 14 
~tanto Cl>oale&l :Jo.o:1c&l 
Cl>o:d.e&1 (:;s) 
1~2 Aoah1 Dov Dow Aoah1 
Oht:lli.cal Oho:al.cal 
(US) 
1~ Tolc7o Rch:a t. !'it tan 1 47.5 
Crt&nic Mo. . a,.,;! col 
Cbeaical (US) 
1959 '!'okai P'oo4 Aooh1 1 25 
Donica *chlnory !leetro-
(US) eho:d.ool 
1960 Japt.n Cll.litornlt. !;ip~=m 1 45 
Petroltu:: Clhttdoal Petro-
Oeter~nt (US) chtmice.l 
1960 Show a Du. Pont Showa 10 ,0 
Neoprene (US) Donl::o 
1960 1(1hu1 DuPont Mitou1 18 
Poly- (US) Petro-
cl-..eai.eal choaicol 
1960 Celon.lte :&U!"or41a Jt&o 1 •:; 
Cbeaical Obr.&lcal 
(US) So•? 
1960 To yo Contintn- Toyo Koa.tw 2 66 .7 
Continental to.l Induttrica 
C..rbon 
(US) 
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TAB:.! e-1 
f'rtnotpal Joint 
:ear ' Joint In•••t- : Po~•tsn ;a,anea• : Capital a For•ltn 
'Jo. (1 s\U.!: :!1~euat estb. t Mnt Co, :0. 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1962 
El tto lbicar ~cc (~'5) ii1 tto Cb..S.-
cal In4uatey 
Jl1tau1 lth,yl ~th,yl Corp .:.U.tou1 
(US) cal 
Cho-.1-
Hoeohet. Hoe chat Japan 
Synlbollo (V.Ger . ) Synthetic 
Luc1dcl Wallace Yoehl to:ai 
Yooh1to~ Tiernan Pht.r!Aceu.-
(V.~r . ) t1eal 
Tun IASP l\itau.'b1th1 
Ba41toh• (V, :ler. ) Patroche:1-
cal 
Japan SUn ~bi- .: .. ,~ ~-
st.,.rr."ll 'hptr cal (::3) Chotieal 
7e1,1n f.erculoa Hercules ~ol~oku 
?ov4er (:.G )~.q<m 
lib• Sdkon 
Do1n1ppon 
Foetor 
Karbon 
Ohomical 
(US) 
!'otter 
3rant (US) 
~itto Fluoro- Du Pont 
chealcal (tiS) 
Ube 
Jndu1tr1u 
Dill :ttppon 
Chotical 
Nittc 
Choaical 
To1j1n lpL1~ox Poudrr Tolkotu ftatcn, 
Qlo:::.! eal the :; !. a aho 
(t.:s) 
10 ~ 
I 50 
0 . ~ 49 
I 49 
c. ~ 49 
4~ 
Jap&n Acrylo Roll: & Toa Goon CJ>oticol, 
Q1a1eal F.aas (US) Sanyo ~r~t1111 
So•rcll n.o In4uotr1al Eanlc of Japan, Lt4 . , SVRm OP PHAI(CE & 
Ir.tUST'!Y (Japan, July/Ausust 1962) , 12 . 
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in the United States, on17 b•nks and other fin•ncial institu-
tion• would ~. intoreated in &xpending the tl=e ond effort 
to Investigate their ~otentlal . ne.f1eior7 cntltlcates 
amounted to onl7 about $1. $ million, and eor,ornta debentures 
drew tl0$,000. 
Eonc!s in foreign currenr.y, on the other hand, aceu:nula t ·ed 
a total of $$L. 2 ~111lon on the first postwar lsoue of Japanese 
corporate bonds in the VD1ted States during 1961. s:nce then , 
the overall foreign currency bond debt has r•oched .112 ~1ll1on 
(See Tabl~ 8 - 8) . 7he ouoooos ot thia venture llluatretea the 
need tor going directl7 into the American money morket when 
oapita1 funding Is to be accOMplished through deoenturos . 
Aa 1o the cue with privata loana , funds can be •·•odlly found 
wb~n !ntereat rates reech 0~ or above . 
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Table 8-8 
Foreign Cur-rencf Bonds 
as o March 
Sold Abroad 
31. 19G2 
by Japan • 
tssue 
National Covt . Bonds 
Sub- total 
Government- Guaranteed Bonds 
Notional Telephone & 
Tclegnph 
Japan Ocvclopacnt Bank 
Osaka City (Genaan Marks) 
Sub- total 
Private Issues 
Sumitorso Hotel 
X:awasaki Steel 
~litsubhhi Chemical 
Nippon Light Metals 
Sub-total 
GRAND TOTAL 
Ottto 
January 1959 
April 1961 
October 1961 
February 1%2 
January 1961 
January 1961 
November 1961 
11arcn 1962 
Amount 
($ millions) 
30. 0 
20. 0 
20. 0 
25 . 0 
S.ll 
4 . 0 
4 . 425 
3.0 
30. 0 
65 . 00 
17. 225 
112. 225 
Source: Departaent of State Alrgraa (roa Aaerican Eabassy in 
Tokyo, July 25 , 1962, b. 
• These bonds ~re not included in the table on page 43• as 
they have been placed overseas for foreign currency. The 
bonds in the table on page43 were sold in tho do~cstic 
aorkct . 
9 . 1 Cases 
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Chapter 9 
S:SIECTJID CAS3 Sl'UDI :::S 
In order to bri ng the inves~nt picture into sharper 
focus, the following selected eases will be uti lized to depict 
the ox?er1enees of American investors in Japan . Unfortunate ly, 
due to proprietary security , only a f ew of the firms will be 
identified . For illustrati on , however, lists of JOajor .1oint 
ventures and ot ten recent licensing arr~~e~ents are included 
at the end or this section (See Tables 9-1 & 9- 2) . A complete 
listing or the validated or approved firms investing in Japan 
may be found in the a~propriate publication of the Foreign 
Capi tal Researoh Society, 
The experience of one firm illustrates t he necessity 
of convincing an industry ministry of the value of the invest-
ment . This 9articular firm has 7 technical assistoncc qgree-
menta pending wi th t he l~inistry of International 'I'rade and 
Industry (InTI), some on a straight cash basis and others 
with royalty . One proposal involv~s a product and proeeoo 
which is patented in Japan and which is also so~what unique . 
The industrJ ministry most concerned has not on:1 agreed to 
a 7 . 6~ roJalty, but is encouraging tho YinistrJ of Finance 
(~OP) to agree . In addition , this ministry is willing to 
subsidize consumers of this essential product and is already 
encouraging those customers to buy . Nonotholoss , approval 
time for this firm and for others with essontiol ideas is 
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del ayed due to tho lack of internal coordination within and 
between the ministries . Delays of up to a ye~r and ov or are 
not uncommon. 
Moreover , there exists the problem of negotieting contract 
renewals . . Success depends on the existing bergoining ?Osition 
of the foreign firm, and upon the toughness exhibited . One 
United States clothing firm apolied for renewal of several 
$- year contrects which had an extremely low royalty rate or 
about 1~. When tho government replied that the rato hod to 
~e reduced, the company submitted a brief proving thet exports 
mede possi ble by the license were earning $90 million per year, 
that this was closo to 200~ of the total cost to Japan in foreign 
exchange of these operations , including !Uyalty remittances 
to the United States, and reminding the government of the 
pat ent protection enjoyed. Disturb•d at the i dea that the 
company threatened to withdraw, the government repli ed within 
3 months that the agreement could be renewed ot the original 
rate . S8 
folost compani es , however, do not enjoy such a good bar-
gaining position. Aftor 9 months of nagotiation, !Unneapolis-
Honeywell was obliged to take a '~ cut from the original rate 
of 10~. This si t uation was coropliceted by the fact that 
Honeywell owns $0~ of the licensee, Y~atake Honer•ell Keiki 
Co., as a rasult of accepting equity royalties under tho 
original agroemont in 19$8. Cstensibly, the Japonese government's 
$8. Eusiness International, op . cit . , 32. 
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motive was to reduce the American partner 1s control over the 
joint firm. Whether, in these cases, it 1e the gov&r~~ent on 
its own initiative that is ~ushing for a lower rata, or whether 
the Japanese partner is requesting the move is difficult to 
determine . Rogardloss, the safest ~ove for a foroign eoneern 
is to t ake out patents in Japnn and also in the najor export 
markets; and , thoroby, strengthen ita bargaininc position. 
For a firm sueh as the Foxboro co., which has both pro-
duction nnd sales agreenonts with Yokogawa Electric .;orks, 
Ltd., the prospoets for renegotiations >re good , inas~ueh 
as Poxboro acts a principal agent tor cx?ort sales ot the 
Japanese concern. Such additional arrangements point out the 
valuo of a foreign firm in obtaining needed foreign exchange . 
Furthermore , it softens the attitude of the gove~~ent toward 
such tieups . 
I ndicative of the growing interest of AmPrican firms in 
long- range investments is the number of tieups tlhich result 
in an equity invest~ent through the assistance of unique 
technology agreements . In 11ay 19$9, the Aluminuo Co. of 
America received validation for one- third ownership in FurUkawa 
Aluminum Co., Ltd . In most ot such case s , it is ~portant 
that the foreign partner have less than majority control in 
order to win gove~~ent approval. 
In addition to the essentiality of the investment, it 
1s also importont to have on int'luontial Japaneu pArtner . 
One United Statos tirm, ·4Qich haa 49% OQUity and a $~royalty, 
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not only has a powerf'ul Japanese partner, but has also received 
orders from the Japan Defense Agency . Although the govern~ent 
is unhappy with tho equity setup, it has gone along with the 
proposel . Another example io the esse of the Otis Elevator 
Co . which decided to sell 20% of its stock in its Japanoso 
subsidiary to Toshiba, a Momoer of the Y.itsui group . 
On ~he other hand, the well-known Singer ease is an 
example of the influence ot Japanese competitors . •ben Singer 
acquired half the equity in a joint vonture with the Japan 
Steel Co . 1n the mid 1950's the entire Japanese se~lng msehine 
industry lined up in opposition to this venture, and Singer's 
&?plication for valldotion W>s qUietly shelv•d by the GOV'·rn-
ment . In addi tion, Singer has a wholly-ownad trading branch 
in Japan, whose requests for ?rofit r«mittenees h,ve been 
consistently turned down. In 1958, eXports from the ~oint 
venture to Southeast Asia broUght in almost $1 million in 
foreign exchange; and exports have increased ever since then. 
As a result of its frozen yen earnings , Singer has reinvested 
all of its dividends in the venture, as has its partner. 
Also , the firm is expanding into new llnos of p>·oduetion. 
Recently, howevor, there have been indications that tbe govern-
ment may allow Singer limited reroiss1on. 59 
~~othor industry which is facing difficulties is the oil 
refining industry but the poculiAr international controls 
exere1aed by the foreign investors and the fact that 5~ 
59. Ibid., 30- 31, 43 . 
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joint ventures constitute a major portion of the industry 
prevent outright exclusion ot foreigners . In t<et, the recent 
switch to oil as a power source has created an un~recodented 
boo=. With the exception of the ldemitsu Co. all of the 
independents (those with no foreign capital invested) have 
accepted "tied loans" fr<llll foreign suppliers of crude oil. 
Nonetheless, the Japeneee are atte~pting to develop a sub-
stantial source of their own . Although they reali•e that 
Western interests will continue to pervade the oil supply 
and refining industries (as ••oll as the gr owing petrochemical 
industry), they will continue in their attempts to l essen 
their dependence on foreign auppliers .60 
An example of the government •s attitude to>rard preventing 
further foreign investment is the Maruzen and Union oil case . 
Maruzen has overreached itself in a rapid expansion program 
into new oil refineries, shipping, petroehemieals, and even 
real estate . On top of a $22 million loan from Union Oil, it 
has also borroHed heavily .from the Bank of A:'>eriea and tho 
Sanwa Senk. Yet, i t needs another $22 million to e~plete 
financing of its fourth refinery. Union has offered another 
loan of $30 million 1n exchange for a substantial stock inter-
est . At the same time, Socony *obil Oi l has offered funds 1n 
return tor a share in the eompe.ny and a voice 1n the manage-
ment . tn November 1962, the government , following a great 
deal of national publicity, said Union could aeouire some 
stock, ~ith a proviso that Maruzen could later r ecapture the 
60. Lawrence Olaon, "Japan's Search for an 011 Policy, " AUPS 
REPORTS SSRVICe (New York, 1962), 3 and 17-18. 
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otoek. But, ~nion could not portic1pate in aanage~Ant or buy 
more ah111.re1 . As thsse te:"!U ere not .ucb •1•~ than an out-
right loon, Un~cn has not yet re~l1ed .61 
Sone companies haYe t5k~n the ~puro yen• 1nvee~n~ route 
to 100~ ownership, such as Adre•~ogrsph-~ult1graph, rell & 
Howell , and International BuoiMsa Machine . "ohile the govern-
m~nt ia not averse to such ventures (ospeciolly it ttey involve 
new technology und contribute to foreign exchange earnings) , 
the thrent or excessive competi tion may force tho government 
to use tho centrolling po•er or the Foreign Currency Control 
which prohibita unautbori:ed contracts bet•oen exchange residents 
and exobense non-rea1denta . Furthermore , aucb oc=pan1e5 ;;.ay 
not, in the ruturo , be allawed to realt royalties, and will 
then be forced to reinvest them aa they now do d1v14ands . 
~••• CO=P•n1os ore looking at the long-range rroapecta , 
when compl•te convertibility of tho Japoneao currency will be 
accomplished . Already , the transre:ro\>!llt;; or non-resident 
deposit accounts 1a a najor stop in this direction. Unfor-
tunately, the gover~~·nt is all too oagor to retain its power 
to control ~ports, e~orts , foreign investMents , and other 
oct1vitiol involving foreign exch6ngo anJ, thus, ~ill not 
rol1nqu1ah ito use or the rc~eign exchange budget in the very 
near rutu~ . Pro• ccn•ert1b111ty aust await a a!gn;ttcant 
deY~lo~nt in Japan's ~conamy en4 !nereaaod prosau~e froa 
other natHns . 
61. Business •eek, "Japan ' s Oil Hunger Sets orr a Free-for-
all , " Novemoer 10, 1962, 96. 
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In S?ite ot these present obstacles, invest~ts are 
still increasing. Although , unlike the 3 companies mentioned 
above, most investors want so.~o g\l(lrantec of rer..i ttanee . 
Just recently, General Precision Equipment Corp. formed a 
joint venture with ~Utsubiahi Elrctric V~g . co. , Ltd . The 
new concern, Hitsubishi Precision , Inc., 1o capitalized at 
$4,0$0, 000; and General Precision will hold 4010 of the stDck. 
The t1eup includes rociprocal exchanges of infor.mation for 
the production and distribution in the Far East of electronic 
computing, navigational , and data-processing oquipm,nt systems. 
Four American executives will be representing American interests 
on the 10-!!l&n t,oard or directc:rs . 
In June 1961, Bell & Rowell took a further step into tho 
Japsneae market by ncqu1ring a 49,~ i nterest in Japan Cine 
Equi pment Mfg . Co . which will produce motion picture carnoras 
and projectors for sale in world markets , exclusive or the 
United States. Another linkUp occured when Olin Mathieson 
formed a $0-$0 joint venture , the Olin- Kadensha Co . , With the 
Kadcnsha Gun Co . of Japan . The firm will produce aocut 8 , 600 
guns in 1962 - 64% of which are destined for the United St•tes 
under the "ilinchester" label. 
In the consumer field , the gove~~ont is allo~ing more 
investments , oapecially wbere pat~nts and trade marks are 
involved. Recently, the American Machine and Foundry Co . 
to~od up with C. Itch & Co, to market outomotic bowling 
equipment in Japan . Other consumer products such as Coea- Cola, 
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Quaker Oats, and Jantzen swimsuits, are now being produced 
and marketed 1n Japan. Just recently, the Jewel Tea Co. began 
making a u.arketing survey in preparation for a proposed ~erger 
with Niehimen Co., Ltd . of Osaka. The outcOMe could very 
well be a chein of Nichimen Jewel supermarkets in Japan . 
9. 2 Co'""entorz 
Such cases are only a small selection from the 1,836 
technology tioupa as of September 1962 and the 298 cases of 
stock acquisition involving management participation and, 
also, the 2o8 eases involving loans as of December 1961. 
Nonetheless, they do exemplify tho fact thet many substantial 
businesses consider Japan a very profitable investment market , 
in s~ite of the government•• protectionist attitude . Under-
standably, the Japanese deo1re investments which will 
contribute to the growth of their economy and standard of 
living. Therefore, potential inveotora must reolioe that tha 
process of a~provnl will be highly selective . In th• field 
or technology contrqets, the subject matter must be a definite 
innovation which will benefit the concerned industry. In the 
area of stock acouisition, the foreign investor ~ust o!fer an 
equitable arrangement which genera l ly allows his Japan~oe 
partner majority control . Those compani~s which are wholly-
owned by foreigners are slowly increasin& but the government 
is ~ill reluetant to pe~it an excessive number, inasmuch as 
it has less control over such J:irms than over Je.pan.se-eontrolled 
firms . 
Realizing tb~se obstacles to be present, a ?Otential 
foreign investor who has "something to offer" generally .,,111 
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tind a means to enter the ~rket, although the go~ernment may 
force b1m to settle for loss than he or1ginall1 bargained for . 
Yet , this is exactlr the reason for further studr and evaluation 
of the investment picture and the busin~s• 3ituetion b7 American 
fims . 
Although, as the above cases indicate, most investors 
acquire a Japaneos partner , it is still possible to set up 
operations alone - as did IBM and ~~p•x Corp. Yet, these 
firms are large enough to be able to afford c~petent over-
seas personnel . In addition, ther possess capab111t1es and 
idees which the Japanese economy badl7 needs . As the economy 
continues to expand, tho Japanese will continue to require 
capital and technology . However ~ as improvements occur in the 
management soctor And as the Japanese businessmen become 
increasinglr f•miliar with their Wsstsrn counterparts, it is 
possible that f\lture investments will be sub!octed to more 
business-like criteria, and loss governmental action. 
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PART IV 
PROSPECTS FOR PUTURZ INVESTM~~~TS 
Chapter 10 
OVERALL JVALUATI ON 
Tho previoua tree~ent or the Japanese econOMy nnd the 
role of foreign capital end technology in the ro~arkable 
postwar growth or that nation's industrial com ,les 1s intonded 
to demonstrate that foreign 1nvostmont - although difficult 
to negotinte - has oeen, and will continue to be , extremely 
profitable. The structure of tho industrial econ(I!"Cy , and ito 
increasing shift to heavy industry and chemical industry oper-
ations , are prtme elomants ~n the projected economic development 
plan. Along with this trend toward hoavy industry , the nation's 
planners recognize an imminent need for numerous social 
overhead capital ventures. 
In order to reoli~e those goals, the govoxnmbnt and busi-
ness circles are well aware of the importance of foreign trade . 
Japan must import raw materials in great abundance so as to 
keep her vast industrial ~achlne working. Yot, she has to 
pay for those inports and , consequently, concentrates a good 
deal of energy and time on the problem of increAsing •xports . 
Reeently, however , Japan has be~n discovering that it is 
necessary to free her import market in order to ir.duee poten-
tial buyer nations abroad to purchase her goods . •dded to 
this problem is the f set that Jap•n finds that •he bulk or 
her exports is largely confi~ed to a few individual ~ark•ts, 
such as the United States end Southeast Asia . On the 
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one hand, in the case of t~ United States , abo i1 consistently 
tacad ~lth a current account de!lclt. in the Balance ot Fayments . 
On tha other, tho poor econ~lc status o! Southeast ~ala ~ooa 
not otter a good Markot tor the increasing number ot oapltal 
goods which Japan is now beginning to export . 
It is, on the foce or thlnga , difficult to underatand 
wnr a nation which is so depen1ent on foreign relations is 
10 reluctant to accept tho capita! and tec~~ologr or no-. 
econa=!cally- sopblstlcated nations , l!ke the United Str,Qs; 
that la , until one beglna to understand tho pee aliar ooclal 
and industrial systems which operata in Japon . rho traditional , 
paternalistic attitude or the sovernrnent and the large number 
or "cottage industries" ' which employ- a goo1 portlon or the 
labor force , aro good roa1ons !'Ol" the ..7apa.nel e to cast a 
·~aundlced ye• at !oroign competition and intervention. 
Aceord1'1P:l,j, th legal and. aonetacy sec'C<r = cro 10 re-
gulated •• to allo~ variable control by tb• govo~ont, These 
oysteme allow the Jopanoee , who hove a penchant for order-
lin,aa and "proper form" ~~;nd: a great rear or the un\cnow-r , to 
k•op track of each sector or the ocon~; . A maJor tc ' in 
thie control is t~e torolgn exchange budget . It, howev<r, 
fundo (foreign c~rroncy or yon) could be froel7 Drought into 
tho country or taken out, the gov~ra~ont ~ould no longor be 
abls to ke•·p track or tlnancld transactions . Leavlnf •olde 
the question of foreign lnvoet:lnents end tb• "dnng•r" of fcre1gn 
1ntereeta bu,-lng up Japonue onter'>rises, co.p1hl .,ovononts 
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would no longer be restrictec to eh•nnela w~ieh the £Overnment 
can etnt.ro.,. . Ulother factor which au;)posedly r.lntox·cea the 
D884 to:- •·lOt control is the depen.denc• or the CcmaeJvat!ve 
Party's future on t~ econaalc develop: nt or the nation. 
Should the econo:y seriously falter, tba proapects tcr tho 
Soeieliat party would appreciably increose. 
Deapite all or those arg~~enta, nonatholeaa, there is 
a growing aw."renass among goverrunent lefldera and buslnosemen 
of the neod for trade liberalization and currency convertibility. 
1he emera1ng generation or bureaucrats an~ •x~cutivee rel1zes 
the voluo or foreign capitol eno technology to tho moderniza-
tion end r•tionalization ot tho Japanese industry. the ~ressing 
need for construction and ~prove~ents in tbe aoc~el overheed 
capital aoctor - eno~us not only in Tokyo, but tbrcughout 
tho country - ere awaying th• political mln~• to a mere li~eral 
attitude toward foreign invest~ent . On top or this, th.re is 
a growing tooling of pride snd seltconfidenca among the people 
in the accomplishments Which they havo achieved . 
Japeneae bua1n•••~en are beginning to compote ravorebly 
with t~ •est in the more sophisticated capital goods, which 
horototo~ were the monopoly or a tew industrial powers . 
Eut, aa n'w markets are inveded , the Japanese must -.k• con-
ceuiona ou><! allo>< greater ila;>cr ta to flow Into Japan in roturn . 
ln the t•co Of such ea=pet1t1on, t~~ bua!nOII CQQMUnit~ 11 
becomins lncreas1ngly conv!nced ot the n ed tor aero ~echr.ology 
and cap1tol invost=ent from the ~eat . Although they Are 
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attempting to lesoen tn~ir dependence on the Unit~d ~tates by 
oncour~ging inYOatlaenta !'rem EUrope and other \lootem countries, 
it io vorr probaole that the feeling or tru1t in the United 
Stateo and the high level or tecbnologr in Aaer~ca ~ill en-
hance fUturo U. S . JapL~eae buaiDOII relationo , 
rho praoent st•tus or ;mericon inveotmenta 1n Japan 
teatltloa to the profitoble nature or auob venturee . The fact 
that thera ia an lnoroase each year 1n these tieups, especially 
the long-term equity investments, le an added indication of 
the confidence of United States busineoamen in tho tuture or 
Japan'• economy. By the same token, tho Japaneae ~~ve gradually 
eaaod the ro•trict1•ma on f"oreign inv .. taont . Although, thoy, 
underotondably, still vish to =ainte1n control over tho t~es 
and an~~t• or !orelgn 1nvestm•nts dur!ng tho rresent stage 
or econonic devolo~ont . 
10. 2 r.onelu•ion 
lt Is to be expected that the growing porticipation by 
Japanoso buaineoo in international trade ond tho growing use 
or modern bualnaso and economic techniques will mok• the 
industrial and gove~ent leaders increasingly aware or the 
value o!' trade liborali:ation and currancy ocnvtrtib!lity. 
Fir•t or all , it 1s a tact that ~sny L"rican corporations 
auscr1be to the practice or re1~vest1ng prot1ts 1n overse~a 
aubo1diar1aa, and such has b•en the coso v1th several Jap.nese 
companies . Consequently, it is to be hoped ~at the Japanese 
will discover that dividends con be laos or a burden on the 
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foreign exchange reserves than interest and royalty payments . 
Secondly, not only do newly- emerging industries roquiro tech-
nological assistance to remain competitive, but so also do 
those firms •hich already have received past assistance. 
Otherwise , they will find themselves falling far ~ohind their 
research-minded competi tior in the lie st. Thirdly, direct 
capt1al investments in the acon~y would create more jobs and 
revenue - as is the case in Britain snd Holland. Fourthly , 
there are meny potential investors Who are eyeing the markets 
or Asia and Oceania with the idea of using Japan as en •xport 
base . In addition to increasing foreign exchange, s~ch setups 
would contribute to the develo1):nent of the nations ol' South-
east Asia . Lnstly , Japan herseLf is ombarked on a course ot 
exporting capital and technology primarily in Southeast Asia 
and Latin AmOrica (See Table 10- 1) . In order to improve the 
market conditions in Southeast Asia (and, also , comply with 
the demands of the United States for increased ocon~ic aid ) , 
the Japanese have invested some $579 million in governmen~ 
funds and $88 million in private invea~ent . Altogether 110 
Japanese companies have ~oved into Southeast ASia , in order 
to help the market which already abs:> rbs 33~ ot Jnpo.n 's exports . 62 
Alao, the United States iG expected to request Japan to join 
the Orgsnization for Economic Cooperation and Development . 
Obviously , 3UCh economi c assistance will intensify pressure 
on Japon's Balance or Payments problems . 
62. Time, "'norld Business , " February 8 , 1963, 8 . 
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OUtstanding Overseas Investments and (Millions of dollars) Loans by Japan 
End : Investment in Dir·rct Deferred 
of : International lnvut- Payment TOTAL 
Year: Organiu.tions IICnt : Credi.ts 
19S7 liS 63 128 306 
19S8 liS 116 ! 56 367 
!959 194 IS7 242 S9S 
!960 202 248 340 790 
1961 264 362 S99 1,22S 
Har. 31, 
1962 264 397 632 1,293 
Committed but not executed as of 
March 31, 
1962 19 40 741 800 
Source: Oepartecnt of State Airgraa froa A=eriean Eabassy in 
Tokyo, July 25, 1962, 8 . 
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Present easing of foreign investment restrictions is 
clear proof that the Japanose are cognizant or tho weight of 
such arguments . Nevertheless, their leaders aro extremely 
cauticust and will continue to exercise control over what 
investments roay enter . Even if full convertibility were achieved, 
it is certain that the governm•nt would retein ~any varied 
measures by which it is able to encourage or discourage business 
enterprise . 
A recent trend in the status of foreign investment was 
brought out in the Bank of Tokyo's w'EEKLY REVIEW for November 
$, 1962,63 Data for the first half of fiscal 1962 (April-
September) concerning the latest approvals were msde available . 
Total v~lue for the 6 ~onths inclusive was $292 million, of 
which $227 million ~as in the form of loans . Stocks accounted 
for ibS million, of which $49 million was through the market 
and $16 million through tieups and stock dividends . Also, 
during this period 166 technological tieups wero approved . 
A recent study by McKinsey & Co, showed that the biggest 
area tor United States business investm~nts abroad ie Nestern 
Suropo , but Japan co~• in as second. 64 Tho boo=ing consumer 
revolutions 1n those countries is attracting a great deal of 
interest . However, the Unite4 States' own Balance of Payments 
situation may provide a slight braking effect . 
63. Departcont of State Alrgram from the American ~assy in 
Tokyo, January 30, 1963, l . 
64. Business Week, "Business Al>roa<i," July 7, 1962, 46. 
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Current predictions of the Dept . of Co~~erco for direct 
plant and equip~ent invcstttent in Japan estimate a total of 
$40 million tor 1963, a drop of $9 million from 1962. However, 
it appears t hat the figures may be scrnewh&t lower than real-
ist ic . Last year's prediction of a drop of l~ in tot.l United 
States investment was contradicted by an actual 14~ increase. 
Also, there is some reason to suspect that the Department's 
hopeful figures for underdeveloped areas , such es the Alliance 
for Progress countries, nay have affec ted predicted statistics 
elsewhere . 
Despi te these predictions, however . the ultinate outcome 
for foreign investment in Japan Will depend on the continued 
growth of her econo~y , the global attitude of her leaders , and 
the availability of fUnds in the United States and in other 
nations . The prospects fo~ continued coopert.tion will be 
furthered by the mutual conf idence each nation has in the 
other. 
A report by tho ~~n1stry of International rrade and 
lndu$try early in 1962 revealed that 17~ of Japan's exports 
in fiscal year 1960 were goods made under l~conse , and that 
tho nation's a~~ual gro~tb was speeded 1 . 2 nercentage points 
a Y<Or as the result of foreign technology . And oquity invest-
mont• and loans are contributions in addition to this . On the 
face of it, such advantages should holp to convince the Japanese 
to welcomo foreign capital, As for the Americans, it is generall y 
said that "they know a good prof1 t when they see it. " 
.. 
* 
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